

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1326656-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 5
Page 26 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;
Page 27 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;
Page 28 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;
Page 29 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;
Page 36 ~ Referral/Consult;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1204182-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 5
Page 26 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;
Page 27 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;
Page 28 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;
Page 29 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;
Page 36 ~ Referral/Consult;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : E. D. Mason

DATE: 2/15/56

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #444-56
Made by SA James J. Middleton
Chicago Office

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SUGGESTION: That a second ~~floating serial~~ such as the FD-238* (copy attached) or a page 2 be made of the FD-238 setting forth background information, reliability, availability, residence, employment and phone number of witnesses utilized in prosecutive reports involving subjects of security investigations. Periodically the Bureau requests such information. The Special Agent to whom the 134 file (Security Informants) is assigned would have the responsibility of maintaining this summary of information in a current status.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Each agent preparing a prosecutive report reviews the 134 files on the witnesses utilized and extracts necessary information from the individual files. The agent then summarizes this information in his own words.

ADVANTAGES STATED: If the information was prepared in advance and thereafter maintained in a current status, the review of the 134 files by agents unfamiliar with the informant could be eliminated. In addition, the wording of the information submitted to the Bureau on each informant would be standardized. Any change to be made on the floating serial could be made in ink or if completely changed it would not have to be reserialized.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: Placing the suggestion in effect would involve some time; however, suggester feels when completed on all 134 files, the resultant saving in time would be justified.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Hostetter, Chicago, recommends favorably as he believes a considerable amount of agent time as well as unnecessary duplication of work in reviewing the files could be saved. The suggested procedure would effect a standardization of background information, and needed information could be easily located.

SAC Kelly, New York, recommends favorably. At the present time there is no great uniformity on how the agent sets out the information and the suggestion would save much agent time in locating the desired information.

RECORDED-41

INDEXED-41

66-2542-2-1002

* (Form FD-238 is maintained as top (floating) serial in all Security Informant files.)

ceh
(2)

23 FEB 21 1956

64 MAR 8 1956

ENCLOSURE EN

21. N

2

E..D. Mason memo for [] Tolson
Re Suggestion #444-56

2/14/56

SAC McCabe, Philadelphia, believes the suggestion in principle has merit. He points out, however, certain flaws and possible modifications to the suggestion. Inasmuch as requests are not received regarding every informant, he suggests that the summaries be prepared only when a request is received and that no project is needed for the preparation of a summary on every 134 file. It would be preferable to place the information on a 3x5 card to be maintained as a separate section of the Agent's Informative Index. He feels the responsibility of keeping the summary in current status could be more easily fixed by dating the summary appearing on the card and checking all cards periodically by a single tickler such as every 60 days.

Inspector Sizoo, Domestic Intelligence Division, recommends unfavorably as the percentage of individuals on whom we have 134 files and who are considered as potential witnesses in Government prosecutions is too low to warrant expenditure of time needed to prepare memoranda as suggested. Memoranda can be written on the informants as required and to prepare numerous memoranda which may not be used is wasteful.

CONCLUSION: In view of the fact that the Bureau does not request such information on every informant, it appears that the necessary project to institute the suggested procedure for each 134 file does not appear justified.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted.

PRB

M

✓ M W

Date

Mark opposite each item the number of the serial or serials in which the information appears. Although these items are regarded as nonvariable, changes may be noted by adding the new serial number and crossing out the old. When form is complete as to all applicable items, the Agent and Field Supervisor should initial the form at the end.

Symbol Number Office File

Type of Informant: SI PSI CS Bureau File

Serial No.

1. Name

2. Aliases

3. Code Name

4. Symbol Number

5. Date and Place of Birth

6. Description

7. Photograph

8. Background Investigation:

(A) File references checked

(B) Credit Inquiry

(C) Local Criminal Check

(D) Bureau Identification Record

(E) Selective Service Check

(F) Check of Armed Services Record

(G) Informants Canvassed

(H) Reliability Check

(I) Patriotism

(J) Reputation

9. Informant Advised Of:

(A) Not Bureau employee

(B) Activities Voluntary

(C) Relationship Confidential

(D) Bureau Labor Policy

(E) Membership Not Sponsored

(F) Not to Retain Copies of Notes - Reports

(G) Reports to be submitted under Code Number and in Third Person

(H) Payments are Income

(I) Use Public Telephones

(J) No Office Contact Personally

10. Statement of Cooperation

11. Post Office Box Number Assigned

12. Informant Indices Card Made

13. Agent who handles information

14. Alternate Agent

Initials Agent

DATE OF MAIL 2-24-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. CHAMPERE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS
OFFICE, ROOM 505.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Inf.-Genl.

REMOVED BY J. C. J.

FILE NUMBER 66 - 2542 - 3 - 1003

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

1 - Section tick
1 - Plastiplate
1 - Yellow file copy

SAC, Albany

March 1, 1956

Director, FBI (66-2542-3) - 1604

RECORDED-89

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

CR-125
There are being transmitted under separate cover copies of the following pamphlets for possible use in connection with the captioned program:


"Communist Attack on Religion"
"Education -- communist style"
"The Katyn Forest Murders"
"Terror in the Baltics"

Twenty-five copies of each publication are being forwarded to the New York Office. Ten copies of each publication are being forwarded to your office and the Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Newark, New Haven, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Portland, St. Louis, San Francisco and Seattle Offices. Five copies of each publication are being forwarded to all other continental offices.

Requests for additional copies of these publications should be directed to the Central Research Section at the Bureau.

2 - All continental offices

JFC:mjh
(3)



READING ROOM
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
150 PM '56

NOTE: Copies of these publications are being forwarded to the field in varying quantities depending on the extent of Communist Party activity in the territories covered by the individual offices.

Plastiplate will be dated on approval of letter.

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated 2/28/56.
JFC:mjh

63 MAR 9- 1956

Folson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Turbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Olsen _____
Jamm _____
Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 28, 1956

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
Bufile 66-2542-3

J. B.

Folson	✓
Boardman	✓
Nichols	✓
Belmont	✓
Harbo	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Rosen	✓
Tamm	✓
Sizoo	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Holloman	✓
Gandy	✓

J. B.

C. C.

The Central Research Section regularly forwards to the field material for possible use in connection with captioned program. The United States Information Agency (USIA) recently prepared the following pamphlets, copies of which are enclosed, and furnished a supply of these publications to the Bureau:

- ~~"Communist Attack on Religion"~~
- ~~"Education -- communist style"~~
- ~~"The Katyn Forest Murders"~~
- ~~"Terror in the Baltics"~~

The first two titles are self-explanatory. The pamphlet "The Katyn Forest Murders" outlines the proof of the murder of several thousand Polish soldiers by Soviet authorities during World War II. The pamphlet entitled "Terror in the Baltics" describes the Soviet conquests of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The enclosed letter advises the field that copies of these publications are being forwarded under separate cover.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the enclosed letter to all continental offices be approved.

Enclosures

- JFC:mjh
(4)
- 1 - Section tickler
 - 1 - J. D. Donohue
 - 1 - Mr. Belmont

REC'D REC'D

RECORDED-89

INDEXED-89
ZC-13

27 MAR 5 1956

EX-SEC

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 8-22-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Informants Genl.

REMOVED BY 11-15-17 1960

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-2-1005

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 3/29/55

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Pages 5163-
5164 Congressman Ashley, (D) Ohio, spoke concerning the use of
confidential informants in the Government security program.
References to the Department of Justice have been noted, and
a reference to the FBI was noted and set forth in an earlier
memorandum prepared today.

Original filed in:

166-2542-3- ✓
N.D.L. 2/19/55
76 APR 19 1955

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional
Record for ~~1/23/55~~ was reviewed and pertinent items were
marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that
portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and
placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

663-26

Date

March 21, 1956

To: Director, FBI

From:

Employee assigned to (Division)
Birmingham

b6
b7C

SUGGESTION

That FD 238 (Security Informant Review Sheet) and FD 237 (Criminal Informant Review Sheet) be stapled, or otherwise securely attached, to the inside of FD 245 (file front). (Sample attached).

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

FD 238 and FD 237 are now filed on top of all other serials in file, however, they are given no serial number.

Advantages of suggestion

When the file is opened, the sheet can be more easily read or posted. The filing of serials in these two classifications would be made easier and faster because only the top would have to be removed, which would be one operation. It is also believed that the sheets would not get as ragged as they ordinarily do if they were stapled to the file front inside.

PROG
MAP 26-1956
RECORDED CCW GARDEN CITY
MAR 26 1956

Disadvantages of suggestion

None that I have been able to think of.

Cost 4/2/56 - hrs
Refund to domestic file and per hr

Annual Savings (Show basis for estimate) Approximate savings cannot be estimated; however, if this procedure was in use, it is believed that you could file 10 separate communications in 10 separate files in the same time that it would take to file 6 files removing the top sheet from inside of file.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim or a renegotiation by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

Clerk

Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head It is recommended that this suggestion be given favorable consideration. Inasmuch as an FD-209 form must be filed with each contact of an informant, any way in which the process can be expedited and facilitated would be advantageous. To 100%
D. W. FULTS
Signature and Title SAC

b6
b7C

Security Informant Review Sheet
FD-258 (7-12-55)

Date

Mark opposite each item the number of the serial or serials in which the information appears. Although these items are regarded as no variable, changes may be noted by adding the new serial number and crossing out the old. When form is complete as to all applicable items, the Agent and Field Supervisor should initial the form at the end.

Symbol Number

Office File

Type of Informant: SI PSI CS

Bureau File

Serial No.

1. Name
2. Aliases
3. Code Name
4. Symbol Number
5. Date and Place of Birth
6. Description
7. Photograph
8. Background Investigation:
 - (A) File references checked
 - (B) Credit Inquiry
 - (C) Local Criminal Check
 - (D) Bureau Identification Record
 - (E) Selective Service Check
 - (F) Check of Armed Services Record
 - (G) Informants Canvassed
 - (H) Reliability Check
 - (I) Patriotism
 - (J) Reputation
9. Informant Advised Of:
 - (A) Not Bureau employee
 - (B) Activities Voluntary
 - (C) Relationship Confidential
 - (D) Bureau Labor Policy
 - (E) Membership Not Sponsored
 - (F) Not to Retain Copies of Notes - Reports
 - (G) Reports to be submitted under Code Number and in Third Person
 - (H) Payments are Income
 - (I) Use Public Telephones
 - (J) No Office Contact Personally
10. Statement of Cooperation
11. Post Office Box Number Assigned
12. Informant Indices Card Made
13. Agent who handles information
14. Alternate Agent
15. Concealment and Characterization Guide

NO SERIAL NUMBER:
KEEP ON TOP OF OTHER SERIALS IN FILE.

Initials Agent
..... Supervisor

ENCLOSURE

44-30125-1007

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 4-4-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Inf. - General

REMOVED BY 58 APR 24 1956

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1007

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 4-23-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL *Security Inf. - Genl.*

REMOVED BY 1030

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1008

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓

DATE: 4/18/56

FROM : E. D. Mason M.

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #663-56

b6
b7CMade by [redacted]
Birmingham Office

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Harbo ✓
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

SUGGESTION: That Form FD-238 (Security Informants Review Sheet) and Form FD-237 (Criminal Informant Review Sheet) be stapled, or otherwise securely attached to the inside of Form FD-245 (File Front). Samples are enclosed.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Forms FD-237 and FD-238 are not serialized in the file, and are maintained as the top serial in file.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Sheet can be more easily read or posted when the file is opened; filing of serials in these two classifications would be more easier and faster because only the top would have to be removed, which would be done in one operation. Suggester believes these sheets would be subject to less wear and tear. Suggester also believes that 10 separate communications could be filed in 10 separate files in the same time that it would take to file 6 files by removing the top sheet from the inside of the files.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Fults, Birmingham, recommends favorably. Inasmuch as an FD-209 form (Memorandum for Recording Contacts with Criminal and Security Informants) must be filed with each contact of an informant, any way in which the process can be expedited and facilitated would be advantageous.

Assistant Director Belmont does not believe the suggestion should be followed, however, he points out that this is essentially a field office administration and filing matter. His objections are: if staples become loose, as they sometimes do, this might result in minor lacerations of clerks' hands in handling such files; and there is the likelihood of the review sheet being torn and mutilated by reason of the corner or other file cover slipping under it between the staples. He states a check with the Records Section at the Bureau indicates there have been a noticeable number of instances of personnel being injured by staples, particularly when heavy material such as cardboard is stapled.

RECORDED - 24 (1,75) 1009
 Mr. Winterrowd, Investigative Division, has no objection to the adoption of the suggestion, but he also points out that this is a field administration problem. INDEXED - 24

SAC Foster, Newark, believes the suggestion has merit, but does not like the idea of having this material stapled to the file front. He suggests that the information contained on FD-237 and FD-238 be mimeographed on the inside of the field office file front. This work can be done on the mimeograph machine.

ceh (2)

E. D. Mason memo for Mr. Tolson
Re Suggestion #663-56

4/18/56

ASAC Fletcher, WFO, believes the suggestion is desirable, but recommends that these sheets be stapled only at the top of the file cover so that anyone reviewing the file can be certain there is nothing on the back of the stapled material which would be of importance. He believes the suggested procedure should be authorized on a permissive basis.

ASAC E. E. Brown, Philadelphia, recommends unfavorably. The forms would have to be revised or some of the items at the bottom cut off as some informant's files still have the old type file covers where the Acco Fastener is placed on the outside of the file, (new file covers are longer and have a $1\frac{1}{2}$ inch flap at the top so as to allow the Acco Fastener to be placed inside the file). If the forms were not stapled at one end of the cover, the forms would become crumpled. He doesn't consider the suggestion any material savings.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion and countersuggestions not be adopted.

MW
JMB

✓

M

May 3, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. NICHOLS
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT

Yesterday, Congressman Walter, of the House Un-American Activities Committee, called to see me.

Congressman Walter stated that he had recently named as head of the staff of his Committee Mr. Richard Arens, who has been serving with one of the Senatorial Committees. The Congressman stated that he had two matters which he wanted to specifically discuss with me.

He stated that he assumed that from time to time certain confidential informants of the Bureau being exposed in trials of Smith Act cases, denaturalization cases and appearances before the Subversive Activities Control Board thereafter became inactive as informants for the FBI in view of their exposure. He stated that he would like to have the cooperation of the Bureau in furnishing to him the identities of any such persons so that the Committee might consider calling such ex-informants and building hearings about such information as they may have already disclosed in judicial or administrative proceedings.

I told the Congressman that his assumption, of course, was correct and that the names of these persons had appeared from time to time in the press. He said he realized this but that ~~many~~ times his Committee would not note the names and for that reason he was hopeful that a list of such persons might be furnished to him and other names furnished in the future as the usefulness of the informants is at an end in so far as the FBI is concerned. I told him that I would have a check made of what names might be available. I pointed out to him that, of course, the names of some informants used in denaturalization proceedings would be a matter for the Immigration and Naturalization Service to pass upon and he said he understood that. I would, therefore, like to have a list of names of such informants with whom we are thoroughly through and who are of no more value to the Government so that we may forward the same to Congressman Walter.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Persons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizemore
Tavel
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

55 MAY 8 1956

542-3
SENT FROM D. C.
191 MAY 7 1956
NOT RECORDED
191 MAY 7 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

Messrs. Tolson, Nichols, Boardman, Belmont

May 3, 1956

The second matter that the Congressman desired to take up was that of Judge Edgerton, of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Congressman stated that he had in mind calling Judge Edgerton before his Committee, and if the facts could be developed, having the Judiciary Committee look into the situation with a view to initiating impeachment proceedings against Judge Edgerton. The Congressman stated that he understood that Edgerton had been a member of a communist group in the District of Columbia after he, Edgerton, had become a Judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. I inquired of the Congressman as to the identity of the organization and he stated that it had dropped his name for the time being, but that he would look it up. The Congressman was desirous of receiving from us any information which might be furnished to him dealing with Judge Edgerton. I told Congressman Walter I would have our files looked into and see what, if any information might be available and then a determination would be made as to whether it could be supplied. Will you please have an appropriate summary made upon Judge Edgerton with an indication as to any material which should not be furnished to the Congressman because of its confidential character.

During the course of my conversation with the Congressman, he mentioned the fact that his Committee would shortly issue a pamphlet dealing with the views of prominent persons as to the meaning of the recent alleged change in the attitude of the Soviet Government on world relations. He stated this publication would be forthcoming shortly and he believed it would serve a useful purpose in establishing the fact that there has been no real change in the Russians' goal and intentions, but merely a deceptive change to apply to methods and tactics.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

FD-252
(12-14-54)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION #761-56

Date: 5/4/56

To: Director, FBI

From: SA THEODORE A. SANDERS Division of assignment: KNOXVILLE

SUGGESTION: It is suggested that a form be maintained in the sub file of a security informant to show the identity of communications and reports in all cases where information from a security informant has been reported. This form to be kept in the sub file as a top document and not to be serialized. (See attached Sample 1). It is suggested that a form be used by Agents in identifying those communications and reports in cases where the information from the informant is reported. This form to be routed to the Agent or supervisor handling the security informant for the purpose of entering the data on the form maintained in informant's sub file. (See attached Sample 2).

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts): Manual of Instructions,

Section 107M, 18, page 11, states that security informant files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant (cont'd)

Advantages of suggestion: The form suggested (Sample 1) would be of value in showing the identity and location of all communications or reports in which information obtained from an informant was subsequently reported for its contents per se, or to characterize or document an individual or organization. The greatest value of this form lies in the fact that should the security informant be discredited at a later date, the title of all cases and dates of communications or reports would readily be available. A review of this form would show all offices receiving the communications and would greatly facilitate any corrective action taken pursuant to Section 107S of the Manual of Instructions. Use of form (Sample 2) would facilitate the recording of this info in informant's sub file.

Disadvantages of suggestion:

66-2543-3-1010

RECORDED-75

DD 1 1956

Memo T. J. Burchard re to
Mr. A. H. Belcher 5/4/56 - b/c
The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of a signature by
me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

EX. - 120

- Mr.
 Mrs.
 Miss

Theodore A. Sanders
(Signature of Suggester)

Recommendations and comments of Division Head: (See page 2)

96 JUN 1 1956

J. G. Belcher
Special Agent
(Signature & Title)

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts): (cont'd)

has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the files of the informant without the necessity of conducting extensive research. Section 107S, pages 16 and 17, set forth corrective action to be taken in the event a security informant is discredited.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS OF DIVISION HEAD:

I recommend that serious consideration be given to the above suggestion. It does not appear to entail any considerable additional administrative burden, but should operate in a substantially automatic manner and would greatly simplify the task of the field office in taking the necessary action when for some reason or other it is necessary to know the distribution afforded information furnished by an informant and, more specifically, in those instances where parallel distribution must be made of qualifying information relative to the source.

S A M P L E N O . 1

FD----

RECORD OF REPORTED SECURITY INFORMATION

Symbol Number [redacted]
Type of Informant ST
Office File Number [redacted]

b7D

Information obtained from the above Informant, either orally or by written report, has been set forth in the following communications:

<u>DATE & TYPE OF COMMUNICATION</u>	<u>TITLE OF CASE</u>	<u>OFFICE FILE NO.</u>	
Report of SA JOHN DOE dated 4/12/56	[redacted]	: SM -C	100-6363
Letter to NY dated 4/23/56	[redacted]	SM-C	100-4534
Letter to Bureau dated 4/26/56	CP, USA-FUNDS; IS-C		100-7865
Airtel to Atlanta dated 5/1/56	[redacted] was.; SM-C		100-360

b6
b7C

Entries May Be Handwritten
Keep on Top of Other Serials in File
Do Not Serialize

S A M P L E N O . 1

EXCLOSURE

S A M P L E N O . 2

FD-----

TO: SAC
FROM: SA JOHN DOE
RE: [redacted]
ST

b7D

Information obtained from the above Informant has been incorporated in the communication described below:

Airtel dated _____ to _____ entitled _____

 Teletype dated _____ to _____ entitled _____

 Letter dated _____ to _____ entitled _____

 Report of SA JOHN DOE dated 4/12/56
entitled [redacted] SM-C Office File 100-6363

b6
b7C

PLEASE ROUTE THIS FORM TO AGENT OR SUPERVISOR HANDLING ABOVE INFORMANT.

ROUTE TO _____
Destroy after making entry on
FD----Record of Reported Security
Information

SAMPLE NO. 2

ENCLOSURE
4-12-56

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AMH*

DATE: May 14, 1956

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *JFB*

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 761-56

O SECURITY INFORMANTS - 6-11-56

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Masog *✓* _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Heffelfield *Officer*

Reference is made to Employee Suggestion Number 761-56 submitted by Knoxville to the effect that a form be maintained in the sub file of a security informant to show the identity of communications and reports in all cases where information from a security informant has been reported. This form will not be serialized and will always remain on the top of the file. In addition it is suggested that another form be used to identify communications and reports in cases where the information is obtained from an informant which form will be routed to the Agent or Supervisor handling the informant so that he can enter the appropriate data on the first form maintained on the informant's sub file. The purpose of this suggestion is to have readily available the identity and location of all communications or reports in which information obtained from an informant was subsequently reported so that if the informant is discredited at a later date the title of all cases and communications will be readily available.

It is not felt that this suggestion should be adopted for the following reasons:

(1) There now is a floating serial on the top of each informant file known as FD-238 which is a check sheet on which various items are checked off relating to administrative matters in each informant's file. It is not felt that we should add another floating serial to each informant's file.

(2) The main purpose of this suggestion is to have readily available the identity of files, etc., to which information from informant has been channelized. This data is now available in all informants' files as copies of channelized reports which are based on information from informants now indicate to which files the information is channelized. It is now required that one copy of every channelized memorandum must be placed in informant's sub file. Since these channelized memoranda indicate the files where the information is channelized, it is not felt an over-all floating serial containing the same information should be utilized.

cc - Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 93

66-2542-8-1011

Mr. Baumgardner

20 MAY 29 1956

Mr. Donohue

JDD:ojk

(4)

file 3 ENCLOSURE

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

(3) Since it is not believed this new form in the nature of a floating serial be utilized, it is likewise felt that Form Number 2 which would be used as a means of obtaining information for Form Number 1 should also not be used.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division and it is not recommended that Suggestion Number 761-56 be adopted. It should be noted it will require more work to keep the proposed floating serial up to date over a period of time than it would be to review the file at the time the informant is discontinued.

ADDENDUM BY TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION: 5/21/56 - ceh

Training and Inspection Division recommends unfavorably in view of the observations set forth above. The recent Clerical Supervisors' School also recommended unfavorably as the forms would be too much duplication and would result in too much work. Some of the members of the school were opposed to floating serials.

0-1
(9-22-54)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, New York (Your file) DATE: 5/14/56

FROM : Director, FBI (Bufile & serial 66-2542-3)

SUBJECT: Security Informant Program

Office of Origin: my

1. () The deadline in this case has passed and the Bureau has not received a report. You are instructed to submit a report immediately. In the event a report has been submitted, you should make a notation of the date on which it was submitted on this letter and return it to the Bureau, Room # 1243.

monthly ltr
Report submitted 5/4/56

Report will be submitted _____

Reason for delay _____

2. () Advise Bureau re status of this case.

3. () Advise Bureau when report may be expected.

4. (✓) Sum ^{let} immediately.

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAY 15 1956	
FBI - NEW YORK	

(Place your reply on this form and return to the Bureau. Note on the top serial in the case file the receipt and acknowledgment of this communication.)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 3-22-56

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

On pages 5163-5164, Congressman Ashley, (D) Ohio, spoke concerning the use of confidential informants in the Government security program. Mr. Ashley stated, "How much longer, I wonder, are we going to be content to find excuses for a security system lacking both in principle and honesty." He included excerpts from a decision of the court of appeals on this subject. It is stated in the decision, "Furthermore, in considering the public interests in the preservation of system under which unidentified informers are encouraged to make unchallengeable statements about their neighbors, it is not wise to bear in mind whether or not we must look forward to a day when substantially everyone will have to contemplate the possibility that his neighbors are being encouraged to make reports to the FBI about what he says, what he reads and what meetings he attends."

Note this is the
same man criticizing
us in the Tillimon
case.

166-2543-3-
NOT RECORDED
APR 16 1956

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for ~~March 22, 1956~~ was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

APR 18 1956

Original filed
66-1731

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 5-25-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Secy. Inf. General

REMOVED BY

59 JUN 5 1956

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1012

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Donohue
Mr. Bly

SAC, New York

June 7, 1956

Director, FBI (66-2542-3)


SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

RECORDED - 40 66-2542-3-103

The New York Office has furnished to all offices at least two copies of the June 5, 1956, article setting forth the text of the speech made by Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Communist Party, Soviet Union, on February 25, 1956, denouncing Stalin.

Rec - Albany
Albuquerque
Anchorage
Atlanta
Baltimore
Birmingham
Boston
Buffalo
Butte
Charlotte
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
El Paso
Honolulu
Houston
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Knoxville
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis

Rec - Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Mobil
Newark
New Haven
New Orleans
Norfolk
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland
Richmond
St. Louis
Salt Lake City
San Antonio
San Diego
San Francisco
San Juan
Savannah
Seattle
Springfield
Washington Field Office



Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

31

NOTE ON YELLOW: See memo Belmont to Boardman, 6/5/56,
HOB:hif, entitled "Security Informant
Program."

Original on Plastiplate.

HOB:hif
(109)

ENCLOSURE

UNSEARCHED COPY FILED 12

Letter to SAC, New York

The following offices have been furnished ten copies of the article: Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, New Haven, Pittsburgh, and Seattle.

The following offices have been furnished twenty copies of the article: Chicago, Los Angeles, Newark, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.

The New York Office has a large number for its use. If any office needs additional copies, request should be made promptly of the New York Office for same.

This denunciation of Stalin enumerating the crimes committed by him over a twenty-year period is a tremendous psychological weapon to assist in bringing about defections among Communist Party leaders. Every effort should be made to immediately capitalize on this development. All Agents handling interviews of Communist Party members should be thoroughly conversant with Khrushchev's speech and the charges against Stalin contained therein. Those offices receiving extra copies of Khrushchev's speech should consider furnishing such copies to those Communist Party leaders believed to be most susceptible for defection. The copies could be furnished at the time of interview or reinterview or mailed prior thereto.

Each office should give this matter prompt and aggressive supervision.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 5, 1956

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

OKD
ETI

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Attached is the yellow of a plastiplate letter to SAC, New York, copies to all other offices, which advises that the New York Office has furnished to all field offices copies of Nikita Khrushchev's speech given February 25, 1956, wherein he denounced Stalin for crimes committed over a 20-year period. This letter to all offices points out that this denunciation of Stalin is a tremendous psychological weapon for use in bringing about the defection of Communist Party leaders. All offices are instructed to have Agents handling interviews of Communist Party members become familiar with Khrushchev's speech and the crimes committed by Stalin. The field offices are further instructed to consider furnishing copies of Khrushchev's speech to Communist Party leaders believed to be susceptible for defection at the time of interview, reinterview or mailed to them prior thereto. Each office is instructed to give this matter prompt and aggressive supervision.

The New York Office was telephonically instructed on June 4, 1956, to obtain 500 copies of the June 5, 1956, "New York Times" article. On June 5, 1956, the New York Office was instructed by airtel to furnish two copies to each field office with additional copies to the 13 offices engaged in Toplev interviews of Communist Party leaders.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached yellow of the plastiplate letter to SAC, New York, copies to all other offices, be approved. After approval, it should be returned to Mr. H. O. Bly, Room 1517, for preparation for dissemination.

Bufile 66-2542-3
 cc - Mr. L. V. Boardman
 Mr. A. H. Belmont
 Mr. J. D. Donohue
 Mr. H. O. Bly

HOB:hif
 (5) *hif*
 Enclosure

RECORDED 40
 INDEXED 40

66-2542-3-1013

DATE OF MAIL 6 - 26 - 56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Secy. Inf. - General

²⁰⁵ REMOVED BY 68 JUL 10 1956

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1014

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

SAC, Springfield (66-1368)

June 29, 1956

Director, FBI (66-2542)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Security
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

(C) Reurlet dated 6-11-56 reflecting that you are currently operating 5 security informants and are attempting to develop 3 additional potential security informants.

Bufiles reflect that as of April 10, 1956, your office was operating the same number of informants and was attempting to develop 7 additional potential security informants.

The decrease in the number of potential security informants being developed by your office is being brought to your personal attention so that immediate positive steps will be taken to reverse this unfavorable trend.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Original incoming mail is "June" and is not being attached. W

RECORDED - 49

66-2542 - 3-1015

EX-120

16 JUL 3 1956

COMM - FBI
MAILED 20

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 R.H.H. _____

RHH:amk
 55 JUL 10 1956

XW
 JF
 RHH

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. J. A. SIZOO

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY INFORMANTS - (C-1)

DATE: June 11, 1956

Tolson	(C)
Nichols	
Boardman	
Belmont	
Mason	
Mohr	
Parsons	
Rosen	
Tamm	
Nease	
Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Holloman	
Gandy	

At his request, I talked in some detail to Special Agent John Keane, of the Los Angeles Office, on June 7, 1956.

Evening
Keane has an intense interest in the development of informants. He feels that the present system of evaluating informant coverage in a field office is not correct, in that the lack of coverage is not sufficiently pinpointed. He stated that to have 100% coverage in the Communist Party would require an informant in each club, of which there are over 200 in Los Angeles, for example. He felt that each office should be required to show the extent of its coverage by clubs rather than geographically, as only in this manner would the real informant coverage be shown.

I told Keane that his idea had merit and that as a result of the Informant Conferences recently held, instructions are being prepared at the Bureau requiring the SACs to set forth steps they are going to take to increase their informant coverage and, particularly, the method by which they are going to insure that sufficient man power is applied to develop informants. I pointed out that after a certain time the law of diminishing returns sets in and we must be careful that in our attempts to reach 100% coverage we do not go overboard in costs both as to man power and funds. Nevertheless, I agreed that we should make the offices pinpoint just what coverage they have, and I think that in our instructions to the field we should require, say, a quarterly report reflecting the number of clubs, sections and divisions of the Party, together with those in which we have informant coverage and those where we do not. This will definitely pinpoint the problem to the SAC and force him to give it attention.

AHB:LL

(3)

cc--Mr. Belmont

cc--Mr. J. A. Sizoo

55 JUL 27 1956
cc to [unclear]Sec of State
6/25/56RECORDED - 72
INDEXED - 72

46-2542-3-1086

21 JUL 28 1956
13Paulson, T
Amerson, C
FILED IN 100-725-111
11-11-11

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Sizoo from Mr. Belmont

Mr. Keane also felt that there was a large reservoir of man power tied up in the preparation of security reports and he felt that if we could severely streamline security reports, man power would be made available for the development of informants. His thought was that when a subject has been placed on the Index, the case has been made, and in the annual reports thereafter, information should be restricted to a positive showing that the subject is still active, leaving out cumulative data which may have been assembled in the file. He extended this thought to the original report recommending a person for the Index, and stated that the essential thing is the proof the individual should be on the Index and that other material is extraneous.

I pointed out to Mr. Keane our problem of dissemination here at the Seat of Government and the name checks from other Government agencies, running well over a million, and that we disseminate reports in answer to many of these name checks. He felt that if a requesting agency needed further details, we could always go back to the field.

While I do not agree with Mr. Keane on this, and so advised him, I do agree that any manner in which we can cut out extraneous material from our security reports is desirable, provided it can be done without hurting the security program. For example--the present suggestion being considered by the field to limit documentation. Another example is the possibility of setting forth examples of meetings attended by a subject reported by an informant, and thereafter briefing cumulative information on additional meetings reported by the same informant.

I told the supervisors at the Los Angeles Office of Keane's suggestion and requested them to be continuously studying proper ways and means to streamline our reports without cutting out material essential to the security program. They suggested the possibility of issuing a glossary containing thumbnail sketches on organizations, rather than repeated thumbnail sketches in each report. There are disadvantages to this, but we should consider the pros and cons.

Please see that the above suggestions are given thought, but I do feel we should be constantly alert to cut out unnecessary red tape and extraneous material from our reports, at the same time continuing to operate on a sound basis.

FD-252
(12-14-54)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION # 7-57

Date: 6-26-56

To: Director, FBI

From: C. KENNETH ARNOLD, JR. Division of assignment: LOUISVILLE

SUGGESTION: The Criminal Informant Review Sheet (FD-237) and the Security Informant Review Sheet (FD-238) be made the first document in the file.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):
Section 108-F-8 (p. 4), M of I provides that FD 237 be kept on top of other serials in the file in criminal informant files. Section 107-M-20 (p. 4), M of I provides that FD 138 be kept on top of other serials in Security Informant Files.

Advantages of suggestion:

By placing these forms on the bottom of the file the wear which is presently being experienced by having to remove them from the file each time additional material is added or removed will be reduced to a minimum. Further, the adoption of this suggestion will make for greater ease in the serializing process since it would no longer be necessary to remove and replace these forms each time additional material is added to the files.

Disadvantages of suggestion:

See page two REC'D - 84 INDEXED - 84

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

Mr.
 Mrs.
 Miss

C. Kenneth Arnold Jr.
(Signature of Suggester)

ACK 7/16/56-cc-a
Referred to the Administrative &
Intelligence Service Div.
for review 7/19/56
Suggestion referred to Director
Criminal Division 7/19/56-cc-a

Recommendations and comments of Division Head: I think this suggestion has considerable merit. It will save wear and tear on the form itself and materially reduce clerical function in handling the form. I recommend that it be adopted.

THOMAS J. GENTRY
(Signature) & Title
Special Agent in Charge

34

9961-97M

34

1

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2542-3-1017

"Disadvantages of the suggestion: The only disadvantage foreseeable to the writer is that when the file grows to two volumes resort would have to be had to the first volume to locate the serials referenced on FD-237 and FD-238. The inconvenience to be occasioned appears to be nominal, however, since the serials referred to would probably be found in the first volume of the informant file. The information reflected on the forms in question appears to be of the type which would be developed in the early stages of the utilization of a person as an informant and would necessarily be contained in the first volume of the file.

Criminal Informant Review Sheet
FD-237 (8-18-55)

Mark opposite each item the number of the serial or serials in which the information appears. Although these items are regarded as nonvariable, changes may be noted by adding the new serial number and crossing out the old. When form is complete as to all applicable items, the Agent and Field Supervisor should initial the form at the end.

Symbol Number

Office File

Type of Informant: CI PCI CS

Bureau File

Serial No.

1. Name
2. Aliases
3. Informant Index Card Made
4. Description
5. Background Developed.....
6. Photograph
7. Credit Check
8. Local Criminal Check
9. Bureau Identification Record (FD-9)
10. Past Criminal Activities
11. Criminal Associates
12. Availability To Other Divisions
13. Advised of FBI Jurisdiction
14. Advised of Confidential Relationship
15. Advised Not Employee of Bureau
16. Advised to Furnish Information Only to Bureau
17. Advised Payments are Income
18. Advised Not to Contact Office Personally
19. When Designated CI
20. Indices Search Slip (FD-160) Summarized
21. Statement of Willingness to Aid Bureau
22. Arrangements for Payment
23. Symbol Number Assigned
24. Bureau Advised of Symbol
25. Service Record Checked, if any
26. Flash Notice Placed or Removed

Completed:

Approved:

**NO SERIAL NUMBER:
KEEP ON TOP OF OTHER SERIALS IN FILE**

Date

Mark opposite each item the number of the serial or serials in which the information appears. Although these items are regarded as nonvariable, changes may be noted by adding the new serial number and crossing out the old. When form is complete as to all applicable items, the Agent and Field Supervisor should initial the form at the end.

Symbol Number Office File

Type of Informant: SI PSI CS Bureau File

Serial No.

1. Name
2. Aliases
3. Code Name
4. Symbol Number
5. Date and Place of Birth
6. Description
7. Photograph
8. Background Investigation:
 - (A) File references checked
 - (B) Credit Inquiry
 - (C) Local Criminal Check
 - (D) Bureau Identification Record
 - (E) Selective Service Check
 - (F) Check of Armed Services Record
 - (G) Informants Canvassed
 - (H) Reliability Check
 - (I) Patriotism
 - (J) Reputation
9. Informant Advised Of:
 - (A) Not Bureau employee
 - (B) Activities Voluntary
 - (C) Relationship Confidential
 - (D) Bureau Labor Policy
 - (E) Membership Not Sponsored
 - (F) Not to Retain Copies of Notes - Reports
 - (G) Report to be submitted under Code Number and in Third Person
 - (H) Payments are Income
 - (I) Use Public Telephones
 - (J) No Office Contact Personally
10. Statement of Cooperation
11. Post Office Box Number Assigned
12. Informant Indices Card Made
13. Agent who handles information
14. Alternate Agent
15. Concealment and Characterization Guide
16. Flash Notice Placed..... or Removed

NO SERIAL NUMBER:

KEEP ON TOP OF OTHER SERIALS IN FILE.

Initials Agent

..... Supervisor

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 7/19/56

FROM : E. D. Mason

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 7-57
Made by Mr. C. Kenneth Arnold
Louisville Office

SUGGESTION: That FD-237 and FD-238 be made the first document in the file. FD-237 (Criminal Informant Review Sheet) is placed on top of all serials in a criminal informant file and is a ready reference for files containing data under items listed on the form opposite which items serials have been shown. FD-238 (Security Informant Review Sheets) is placed on top of all serials in a security informant file and is a ready reference for files containing data under items listed on the form opposite which items serials have been shown. Copy of FD-237 and FD-238 enclosed.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Form is made the last document in the file; it is the top serial.

ADVANTAGES: Save wear and tear on the form; would not be necessary to remove form each time material is added to file.

OBSERVATIONS: Investigative Division has no objection to suggestion but feels this is merely a filing procedure and that form's usefulness would not be affected by being on the top rather than the bottom or vice versa. Domestic Intelligence Division recommends unfavorably. Having the form as a top serial will serve as a handy reference and will be a flash to agents to remind them to make any changes necessary. To change the location of the form in all informant files would take a considerable amount of time. Records and Communications Division recommends unfavorably. It takes very little, if any, additional time to remove form and refile it incidental to regular mail filing duties. If form was placed as first serial in file - it would be necessary for agent to call first volume of file when he desired the review sheet even though ordinarily he would need only the last section of an informant file. It is easier to write on a top serial in a file than a bottom serial; therefore, entries made on form would be more legible if form is top serial.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the suggestion ~~not be adopted.~~ INDEXED

Enclosures

cc - Personnel file of C. Kenneth Arnold, Jr. with cc of suggestion form

(hcc)
(S)

(CC:SH/MS)

JUL 24 1956

TEN

FD-252
(12-14-54)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION # 7-57

Date: 6-26-56

To: Director, FBI

From: C. KENNETH ARNOLD, JR. Division of assignment: LOUISVILLE

SUGGESTION: The Criminal Informant Review Sheet (FD-237) and the Security Informant Review Sheet (FD-238) be made the first document in the file.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):
Section 108-F-8 (p. 4), M of I provides that FD 237 be kept on top of other serials in the file in criminal informant files. Section 107-M-20 (p. 4), M of I provides that FD 238 be kept on top of other serials in Security Informant Files.

Advantages of suggestion:
By placing these forms on the bottom of the file the wear which is presently being experienced by having to remove them from the file each time additional material is added or removed will be reduced to a minimum. Further, the adoption of this suggestion will make for greater ease in the serializing process since it would no longer be necessary to remove and replace these forms each time additional material is added to the files.

Disadvantages of suggestion: See page two

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

7/10/56 - eca

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Mr.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Mrs.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Miss

C. Kenneth Arnold Jr.
(Signature of Suggester)

Recommendations and comments of Division Head: I think this suggestion has considerable merit. It will save wear and tear on the form itself and materially reduce clerical function in handling the form. I recommend that it be adopted.

Thomas J. Geary
(Signature & Title)
Special Agent in Charge

16-1 CLOSING

Disadvantages of the suggestion: The only disadvantage foreseeable to the writer is that when the file grows to two volumes report would have to be had to the first volume to locate the serials referenced on FD-257 and FD-238. The inconvenience to be occasioned appears to be nominal, however, since the serials referred to would probably be found in the first volume of the informant file. The information reflected on the forms in question appears to be of the type which would be developed in the early stages of the utilization of a person as an informant and would necessarily be contained in the first volume of the file.

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 7-25-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Informants - Genl

59 AUG 3 1958

REMOVED BY _____

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1019

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

F B I

Date: 7/30/56

Transmit the following message via AIR TELAMSD REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, DETROIT (100-8482) [redacted] (100-8482-sub-2)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-3) (100-247898)

C SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAM
 THOMAS DE LITT DENNIS
 SMITH ACT OF 1940; IS-C

INDEXED - 71

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

b7D

Attached is a 8 page photographic copy of a mimeographed memo captioned "Combating the Informer Evil" which was furnished by [redacted] a source close to the Subject on 7/27/56. The attached report is the only copy available to the Detroit Office; however, the Lab. has been furnished one roll of 35 mm. micro-file film with approximately 200 exposures and requested to furnish the Detroit Office two copies of each in which this memo is included.

Other information received from this informant appears to include CP Funds, dues, and sustainer material as well as what appears to be code names used in the underground for District 7.

Pertinent information will be immediately sent to the Bureau upon receipt of photographs from the Lab. and upon completion of analysis of material.

BROWN

5 - Bureau (Encl.-1)
 3 - Detroit

JWM:CET
 (8)

Pertinent info out
 out in SAC fit 56-29

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Parsons

AIDTCI

RECORDED - 71
INDEXED - 71

66-2542-3-1020

EX-123

INT REC'D

Approved: 30 AUG 7 1956 mgf
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

MR. CLEGG

9/18/53

E. D. MASON

SUGGESTION 202-53
Proposed Form for Criminal and Security
Informant Files in Field Offices.

It seems advisable to resolve once and for all the question as to whether it is more economical for the field to maintain in each file on potential informants and criminal and security informants a form on which may be checked off the presence of certain essential information.

For example, there are 37 items which must necessarily be adequately covered in the file in order to properly handle a security or potential security informant. In addition to the identity of the informant there must be present information as to where the informant may be contacted and the informant's business and home addresses. The informant's description must be shown and whether the informant has a criminal record must necessarily be present. The degree of cooperation which can be expected from an informant is a necessary essential in order to properly contact and handle the informant.

The problem experienced by the field is that in order to locate these individual items of information which are so necessary in the handling of an informant it is necessary often to peruse a rather lengthy file. The proposal which has been made to the Bureau is that a sheet be prepared listing each of the 37 items and providing a space on the form for the serial number where the item may be found. Thus, in order to determine where an informant may be contacted it will not be necessary to review a great many serials in the file but the form will immediately refer the reviewer of the file to a specific serial with the net result there will be a considerable saving of Agent time.

The desirability of having such a form is a recurring question and in my opinion the Bureau has not adequately established a strong foundation for its past action of turning down requests for this form.

For example, in July Inspector Williams recommended that such a form be authorized. It was his belief that considerable Agent/Supervisory time would be saved without in any way sacrificing quality. The substantive aspects of handling an informant do not even enter this question. The form is designed purely to quickly refer the reviewer of a file to the location in a file where essential data can be found in exactly the same manner that an index in the

EDM: hc

Manual of Rules and Regulations refers the reader to a specific section of the Manual.

After receiving Inspector Williams' suggestion the views of several field offices were obtained. Baltimore felt that the form would not be helpful to Supervisors. Philadelphia and WFO agreed with Baltimore. Knoxville felt the form would be helpful, and so did Charlotte.

The Investigative Division doesn't care one way or the other, but believes the adoption of the form should depend upon whether time is actually saved in the field.

It is this one point which in my mind has not been clarified-- "whether time will be saved in the field."

The Bureau's consideration of the form thus far has all been based on views of offices and views of Inspectors (Brown, Nugent, Stein, and Van Pelt favor the form) but no one has any specific measurement of how much will be saved in time.

While ASAC Roy Moore of Chicago was attending In-Service training this week he expressed himself rather vigorously in favor of such a form. While we are in possession of views pro and con as to the merits of the form, no one can prove as yet whether the form saves time or does not save time. We can expect that until we have specific facts we will continue to get requests for the use of the form.

ASAC Moore is desirous of experimenting with the form and would like to have permission to try it in the Chicago Office for a period of six months, during which time he will keep specific figures as to how much time is actually saved by the use of the form. If the picture becomes clear with adequate facts before the expiration of six months the Bureau will be advised promptly with a recommendation.

It is noted that the Executives Conference turned down on 7/30/53 the proposal that such a form be made available for fieldwide use in the handling of criminal informants. The Executives Conference had no actual figures on which to base its decision. It is proposed that we get such figures in order that the Executives Conference may subsequently reconsider this matter.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Executives Conference authorize the Chicago Field Division to use the attached forms -- one relating to criminal informants and one relating to security informants -- for a period of six months and keep detailed figures as to time saved in order that the Bureau may have actual figures with which to measure the benefits or disadvantages of the proposed forms.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (66-2542)

DATE: August 8, 1956

FROM : SAC, Seattle [redacted]

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
SEATTLE DIVISION
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

Responsive to SAC letter number 56-34 instructing that monthly reports on the Security Informant Program be submitted the following is set forth:

(1) Active Communists:	During Past 30 days	Total to Date
------------------------	------------------------	---------------

Number contacted	4	35
------------------	---	----

(2) Other Individuals:

(a) Cases Opened	1	1
(b) Cases Closed	0	0
(c) Number Contacted	0	0
(d) Number Completely Cooperative but not PSI material	0	0
(e) Number Cooperative and being Developed as PSI	0	0
(f) Number Completely Negative	0	0

(3) Results:

Number PSI Developed	0	3
Number of Sources Developed	1	8
Number of Informants Developed	0	0

Analysis of Progress

[redacted] (Bufile 100-327462) is considered by this office to be a member of the Communist Party although he ceased his activity therein voluntarily some time ago. As far as is known he has never been dropped or expelled by the CP as a member and this is substantiated by the fact that in June of this year he attended a function purportedly a "People's World" meeting at the

2 -Bureau (REG)

1 -Seattle [redacted]

JPM:lg

(3)

RECORDED-42

1021

b7D

AUG 16 1956

AUG 16 1956

SE [redacted]

b7D

home of [redacted] one of the most important security subjects in Tacoma, Wash. [redacted] successfully identified the persons present at this meeting.

[redacted] he was contacted but had no information to report. He is being contacted on a regular basis and it is expected that in the fall, when CP activities will be stepped up in that area, he will develop into a valuable security informant.

[redacted] (Bufile 100-329122) continues to be friendly and in an interview had with her on July 24, 1956, she identified a few people known to her to be CP members in Spokane, Washington. She has a reluctance to name the people with whom she associated in the CP. It is possible that the interview had with her on the date mentioned may be the first step of the hurdle toward her full and complete cooperation in the matter of identifying persons she knows to be members of the CP and desire to fully cooperate in this program.

[redacted] Bufile 100-350248) because of [redacted]
[redacted] has limited his activity, and it is expected that soon he will be in a position, if he is so inclined, to participate in this program. [redacted] was contacted [redacted] and had nothing to report.

b6
b7C
b7D

Continued efforts will be made to develop [redacted] and [redacted] as security informants.

Persons Contacted During July, 1956

[redacted] (Bufile 100-350248), [redacted] (Bufile 100-329122), [redacted] (100-352133), [redacted] (100-327462).

b6
b7C
b7D

With the exception of [redacted] the above-named are to be recontacted in an effort to develop them as PSI's. In addition to these three re-contacts, this office has authority to contact the following under this program:

[redacted] (Bufile 100-251305)
[redacted] (Bufile 100-395263).

b7D

The file on [redacted] (Bufile 100-385178) has been reopened and a further contact is contemplated with him during August.

SE [redacted]

b7D

Communist Interview

In accordance with current instructions for reporting, it should be pointed out that to date under this program 35 active communists have been contacted. At the time of the contact with these persons some were active members of the CP and others were members of the CP who had ceased or lessened their activity in the CP but who never were officially dropped or expelled by the CP. For that reason each was considered for informant development.

Other Individuals

A case was opened on [redacted]. There is no record of his name appearing in the files of this office [redacted] being a member of a subversive organization. Through a potential security informant it was learned that [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] who attend CP meetings at [redacted] visited the home of [redacted] after having attended [redacted] near the residence of the potential security informant. As it appears that [redacted] is probably well acquainted with [redacted] it is believed that he has potentiality if he otherwise measures up as a PSI.

Potential Confidential Sources

The case of [redacted] (Bufile 100-352133) was closed by a report which will go forward to the Bureau in a day or so as it appears that because of his age, which has affected his memory and his expressed intent to cease all activity in the CP, he would not measure up to a potential security informant. Although cooperative, [redacted] is not regarded as more than a source by this office.

b6

b7C

The following individuals could be classified and are so considered by the Seattle Office as potential confidential sources inasmuch as they were cordial and friendly when contacted and more or less indicated that they would not resent being recontacted in the future. They did, however, indicate that they did not desire further association with the CP at this time:

[redacted] (Bufile 100-413863)
[redacted] (Bufile 100-352814)
[redacted] (Bufile 100-188727)
[redacted] (Bufile 100-351663)
[redacted] (Bufile 100-181924)
[redacted] (Bufile 100-378688)
[redacted] (Bufile 100-412616)

b7D

SE [redacted]

No individuals as yet are regarded under this program as security informants. b7D

Results

[redacted] are considered to be PSI material.

Utilization of Agents

During July, 1956 one Agent, helped by other Agents, was assigned to this program due to the recent transfer of one of the Agents regularly assigned to this program and, because of the leave situation and the necessity for research to identify prospects for interview, other Agents were used on a part time basis.

Administrative controls have been established to effect the SAC authority type of interview on a much broader scale. The utilization of other Agents on a part time basis has been found to be effective and this office expects to devote more Agent time to this program in the future. Agents have been alerted to the possibility of developing informants by the use of persons with no previous subversive connections but who are friendly to active communists and who might be discreetly approached by these communists to affiliate with the Party.

Continued effort is being made to identify individuals who have in the past operated in the Underground of the Communist Party and who have returned to this area with the view of determining the desirability of conducting interviews with them under this program.

When files are reviewed for any purpose consideration is being given to the desirability of interviewing the person who is the subject of the file. It is expected that definite results within the next thirty days will be more apparent from this new authority.

During the past three month period particular effort has been exerted by the office's security squad to pinpoint membership within the CP. Agents have been conducting Fisur, using Tesur and established informants to accomplish this. They also have been developing new sources among neighbors, friends and fellow employees of subjects. This latter type of contact has been interpreted as falling within the Panel Source Program. This type of effort will continue. Emphasis in the future will be shifted directly to the SAC authorized type of interview.

cc - Mr. Miles

SAC, Denver

August 15, 1956

b7D

Director, FBI (66-2543-S-13)

6 - 77 - 5 1022

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

E-16
Circular dated August 9, 1956, advising that Agents in your office handling security matters are requested to spend one quarter of their time under this program.

The Bureau expects you to take a personal interest in the Security Informant Program to insure that sufficient time is spent on it by Agents in your office to produce the desired results. In your next monthly letter, the actual percentage of time being spent on this program by Agents in your office handling security matters should be set forth. In addition, there should be included a brief narrative analysis of the progress being made and your comments as to what work is planned in the future.

COMM - FBI
Aug 15 1956
MAILED 31

RJM:mag

(4)

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Interrowd _____
ele. Room _____
Jolloman _____
Randy _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8-9-56

FROM : SAC, DENVER

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

b7D

Re SAC letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56.

The following reflects the progress of this program in the Denver Division as of 7-31-56.

1. Active Communists

(a) Number contacted----- 0

2. Other Individuals

(a) Cases opened----- 27

(b) Cases closed----- 2

(c) Number contacted----- 7

(d) Number completely cooperative, but
not potential informant material----- 1(e) Number cooperative and being
developed as PSI'S----- 3

(f) Number completely negative----- 3

3. Results

(a) Number of PSI'S developed----- 3

(b) Number of sources developed----- 0

(c) Number of informants developed----- 0

Eleven agents are presently assigned to the Security Squad, and each agent is requested to spend one-quarter of his time under the Security Informant Program.

The above program has resulted in the development of three PSI'S.

Let's Review
 2 - Bureau (REG)
 1 - Denver
 WB:eg
 (3)

RECORDED-56

EX-100

16 AUG 1956

-1072

I-J. F. Condon
1-Section tickle
I-J. S. Johnson
I-J. D. Donohue

2-Original and copy
1-Yellow file copy
1-Bureau file
(66-2542-3)

SAC, Washington Field

August 10, 1956

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

59461

You should contact Ransdell, Inc., printers and publishers, Washington, D. C., and attempt to discreetly obtain 200 copies of the pamphlet, "Are Communism and Democracy Mutually Antagonistic?" If copies of this publication are available, they should be forwarded to the Bureau marked to the attention of the Central Research Section.

For your information, this pamphlet consists of a transcription of a debate on the topic, "Are Communism and Democracy Mutually Antagonistic?" which was presented on the American Forum of the Air and broadcasted over the Mutual Broadcasting System on May 21, 1948.

JFC:njp
(8)

NOTE:

By letter dated July 16, 1956, New York was authorized to purchase 200 copies of the above pamphlet at 10¢ per copy. By letter dated 8-6-56, New York advised that copies not available there but could probably be obtained through Ransdell, Inc. During recent series of conferences held in the field to facilitate the development of additional security informants, a number of comments were received to the effect that this pamphlet provided excellent conversational material for use in contacting potential security informants. In this debate, Clare Booth Luce and William Henry Chamberlin opposed William Z. Foster and Dr. Harry F. Ward.

ORIGINAL FILE IN

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Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

53 AUG 17 1956

53-142-3

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
AUG 17 1956
SEARCHED

NOT RECORDED
194 AUG 14 1956

MR. L. H. BELMONT

August 3, 1956

V. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
(100-3-99)

SAC-17/27

During the recent series of conferences held in the field to facilitate the development of additional security informants, the field office Agents who participated requested that additional public source material which could be furnished to potential informants be forwarded to the field.

During the period from June 23 to August 3, 1956, the publications listed on the enclosure were forwarded to the field by routing slip by the Central Research Section. These publications have all been previously approved for use in connection with the captioned program. The number of copies furnished to each office varied with the amount of Communist Party activity in the territories covered by the individual offices.

The Central Research Section is presently attempting to obtain additional public source material which would be suitable for use in connection with the captioned program. Any additional publications which are obtained will be promptly forwarded to the field after they have been approved for use in the Toplev program.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information and for recording.

Enclosure

JFC:njp

(6)

- 1-Mr. J. F. Condon
- 1-Section tickler
- 1-J. D. Donohue
- 1-Mr. Belmont
- 1-66-2542-3

161-213-1-4
NOT RECORDED
138 AUG 5 1956

ENCLOSURE

STC

161-213-1-4
AUG 5 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

PUBLICATIONS FORWARDED TO FIELD FOR USE IN TOPLEV PROGRAM

"Communist Attacks on Religion"

"The Deadly Parallel"

"Democracy vs. Communism"

"Education - Communist Style"

"The Great Pretense"

"How You Can Teach About Communism"

"The Katyn Forest Murders"

"The Negro in American Life"

"The Phantom American Negro"

"Primer on Communism"

"A Red Paper on Forced Labor"

"Where Are They Now"

✓ 1 - Bu. file (66-2542-3)
1 - Yellow file copy

1 - J. F. Condon
1 - Section tickler
1 - J. S. Johnson
2 - Original and copy

SAC, New York

August 1, 1956

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ReBulet 6-25-56 captioned "Primer on Communism and How You Can Teach about Communism published by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Internal Security - C."

You should discreetly obtain 100 additional copies of each of the above publications and forward them expeditiously to the Bureau marked to the attention of the Central Research Section.

JFC:njp/nar
(7)

NOTE:

Pamphlet entitled Primer on Communism costs \$.50 per copy.
Pamphlet entitled How You Can Teach about Communism costs \$.25 per copy.
These publications previously approved for use in connection with captioned program and copies of each forwarded to offices where majority of Communist Party activity is concentrated. By letter dated 7/24/56, WFO requested 25 additional copies of each publication. Only seven copies of each publication available at the Bureau, and these are being forwarded to WFO. It is felt that a supply of each of these publications should be maintained in the Central Research Section to accommodate any future requests which may be received from the field for additional copies.

Folson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

✓ NOT RECORDED
28 AUG 2 1956

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE:

X
FROM : J. P. Mohr

Sec 14/10
SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Pages A5919-
A5923 Senator Butler, (R) Maryland, extended his remarks to include a
number of his weekly newsletters concerning the Soviet road to
world conquest. References to the Director contained in two of
the letters (pages A5921 and A5922), in regard to use of informants,
were set forth in an earlier memorandum.

12/17
Original filed in:

ENCLOSURE

66
NOT RECORDED
191 AUG 7 1956

ROUTED BY CHILDRESS ✓

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional
Record for [redacted] was reviewed and pertinent items were
marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that
portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and
placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: August 27, 1956

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS/PROGRAM

J.H.

Tolson	✓
Nichols	✓
Boardman	✓
Belmont	✓
Mason	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Rosen	✓
Tamm	✓
Nease	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Rgom	✓
Holloman	✓
Gandy	✓

Genl
 As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of this year, SAC Letter 56-34 dated June 18, 1956, set forth changes in policy and procedure which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. This authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field, and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing results of this program for the first month of its operation, July, 1956.

JULY, 1956

1.	Active Communists		117
	Number contacted.		
2.	Other Individuals		
a.	Cases opened.	1791	
b.	Cases closed.	435	
c.	Number contacted.	559	
d.	Number completely cooperative but not potential informant material.	200	
e.	Number cooperative and being developed as PSIS.	110	
f.	Number completely negative.	249	
3.	Results		
a.	Number of PSIs developed.	40	
b.	Number of sources developed.	36	
c.	Number of informants developed.	11	

66-2542 Sub 3

RECORDED - 1

Z SEP 12 1956

cc - Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Baumgardner
 Mr. Donohue

* Potential Security INFORMANTS

60 SEP 14 1956

JDD:ojk
(5)

SENT DIRECTOR

ojk

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

It is interesting to note that under the General Interview Program of contacting subjects of security investigations for the month of June, 1956, 184 persons were interviewed. During the first month of the operation of our new Security Informant Program designed to cut red tape and accelerate interviews with individuals in order to obtain additional informant material, 676 persons were contacted. During June, 1956, of those subjects interviewed under the General Interview Program, 2 persons were developed as sources of information whereas in July, 1956, under the Security Informant Program 36 sources, 40 potential security informants and 11 informants were developed.

In the future in order that a clear picture regarding the progress of this program can be presented the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program will be set out.

The field has shown considerable enthusiasm and optimism for this program and it is the general feeling that we will obtain additional coverage through the acceleration of interviews with communists and other individuals. In view of its importance close supervision is being given to the work of each office and letters will be directed to those offices not showing sufficient progress. It was not necessary to send any letters to the field this month.

W. Duff

Moor

September 12, 1968

PROPOSED CHANGES IN
FBI HANDBOOK, PART I

59462

The second paragraph of subsection 8a, which begins on page 15b and concludes on page 19, should be deleted.

Subsection 8b, now on page 19, should be revised to read as follows:

- b. To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization. In requesting this authorization, a justification must be set forth containing following items using these subheadings:

- (1) Residence and employment.
(2) Current membership in organizations.
(3) Summary of information furnished during pertinent period.
(4) Amount paid for services and expenses by month.
(5) Type and number of meetings attended on other activity.
(6) Under what written and oral reports submitted information furnished of unusual value.
(7) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their informant's potential for advancement, stability and reliability. (Set forth p. weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or similar problems presented by informant and steps taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to Bureau.) Indoctrination against disclosure. (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)
(8) All necessary action taken on information furnished.
(9) Miscellaneous. (Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention.)
(10) ~~NOT RECORDED~~ Recommendation. (Use following wording as nearly as possible; "I, therefore, recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to \$ (amount) per (month, week) for services, plus \$ (amount) per (month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of months, effective (date).")

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Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

165
If applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential informant, source or source of information for the word informant
JDD:am (1) See note on yellow page 3

Subsection 8d, page 19, should be revised to read as follows:

59463

- d. When payments have been authorized for a definite period of time, it is necessary to advise the Bureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the payment period as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued and to make a further recommendation concerning additional payments. This justification letter should be submitted every three months in the same form as outlined in subsection 8b above. If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every three months after the date of assignment containing the same information set out above in 8b except those items concerning payment. Set out recommendation of SAC regarding continuation of informant.

Subsection 5, page 20a, should be revised to read as follows:

5. Every 3 months a letter of justification should be submitted to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See subsection 8b, page 19b for form of letter. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

Subsection D captioned, "Source of Information," page 20d, should be revised to read as follows:

1. Definition - An individual, organization or concern which willingly furnishes information to representatives of Bureau with sufficient frequency to justify listing for the benefit of all Agents and there is no reason, under ordinary circumstances, to protect their identity in Bureau communications. If, however, it is repeatedly necessary to conceal the identity of such a source, consideration should be given to listing as an informant or confidential source and assigning a symbol number. Every three months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security sources of information. See subsection 8b, page 19b for form of letter. If the security source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Cardman _____
Elmont _____
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Sons _____
Den _____
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Howard _____
Room _____
Map _____

cc - Conohue
Boardman
Belmont
Training & Inspection

59464

PROPOSED CHANGES IN FBI HANDBOOK, PART I

~~SECRET~~

NOTE ON YELLOW:

*See memo Belmont to Boardman dated September 12, 1956, captioned
"Security Informants and Sources, Justification Letters," JDD:amt*

MR. A. H. BELMONT

September 7, 1956

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
100-3-99

The Central Research Section regularly forwards to the field public source material suitable for use in connection with the captioned program. The Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives (HCUA) recently issued a pamphlet entitled "TRIAL BY TREASON," a copy of which is enclosed. This pamphlet is a documented study of the manner in which the communist movement exploited the cases of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Morton Sobell, who were convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.

Additional copies of this publication have been obtained by the Central Research Section. It is felt that this publication provides excellent material for use in attempting to develop additional security informants.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Central Research Section be authorized to forward copies of the enclosed publication by routing slip to the 24 offices listed below, in which the majority of communist activity is concentrated. The number of copies furnished to these offices will vary in accordance with the amount of communist activity within the territory covered by the individual offices. Routing slips will be used in the interest of economy.

Albany	Detroit	Philadelphia
Baltimore	Indianapolis	Pittsburgh
Boston	Los Angeles	Portland
Buffalo	Milwaukee	St. Louis
Chicago	Minneapolis	San Diego
Cincinnati	Newark	San Francisco
Cleveland	New Haven	Seattle
Denver	New York	Washington Field

Enclosure

JFC:njp

(8)

1-Section tickler 1-
1-J. F. Condor 1-
1-J. D. Denoue 1-
1-Mr. Belmont
46-2542-3

NOT RECORDED

126 SEP. 12 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT


TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 8/17/56

FROM : E. D. Mason

SUBJECT: LEGAL TECHNICALITIES

Tolson
 Nichols
 Boardman
 Belmont
 Mohr
 Hart
 Parsons
 Rosen
 Tamm
 Nease
 Winterrowd
 Tele. Room
 Holloman
 Gandy



Memorandum Assistant Director Mohr to Mr. Tolson 8/13/56 entitled "Increase Fees of Witnesses" states that according to Public Law 875, Eighty-fourth Congress, approved 8/1/56, witnesses hereafter appearing in U. S. Courts and before U. S. Commissioners shall receive \$4 for each day's attendance and 8¢ per mile for transportation. If the point of testimony is so far from the witness's residence that he cannot return thereto from day to day he shall receive an additional allowance of \$8 per day for expenses.

It is suggested that witness fees so arranged as above deserve to be classified as "legal technicalities" which immensely discourage the prosecution of crime. The \$4 which the witness receives for his day's absence from work is pay for 4 hours at the present minimum wage scale of \$1 per hour. If the witness must stay overnight he receives \$8/8¢ a total of \$12 per day which is the per diem allowed to Federal employees but leaves the witness nothing for salary. If the witness is employed by himself, as is so often the case, he is then receiving, in effect, nothing for his day's work.

This subject may be worth some mention in that session of the Criminal Law Section, American Bar Association Meeting, August 27-31, 1956, which will discuss the subject "Are The Courts Handcuffing the Police."

This matter of witness fees may deserve mention in that session of the Criminal Law Section which is going to discuss "An Appraisal of Federal Loyalty-Security Procedure." One of the principal speakers is Dudley B. Bonsal of the New York Bar

cc - Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Crime Records Section

17 AUG 24 1956

D.D.B.
 (6)

Memo to Mr. Tolson

who was chairman of the special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York which brought out a report on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program and suggested that Hearing Boards be given power to subpoena witnesses and that employees against whom charges are being heard be given a greater measure of confrontation by witnesses. They suggest that the Hearing Board should consider subpoena of any witness other than an informant who is "under cover and will continue to remain under cover." If such a recommendation were adopted, the FBI would find it necessary to advise all other witnesses that they would be subject to subpoena. In addition, those subpoenaed would draw those ridiculously low fees for their appearance. These two facts would seem to constitute a major roadblock in our efforts to get the average citizen to provide information in cases of this type.

RECOMMENDATION: None...for information.

DATE OF MAIL 8-24-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Informants Sent.

³⁹³
59 SEP 19 1956
REMOVED BY _____

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1024

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *165-2542 Sub 3*

DATE: September 26, 1956

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont *A.H.B.*SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of this year, SAC Letter 56-34 dated June 18, 1956, set forth changes in policy and procedure which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. This authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field, and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing results of this program for the current month of August, the preceding month of July, and the grand total from the inception of this program which has been in existence for the past two months.

	AUGUST	JULY	TOTAL
1. Active Communists Number contacted	131	117	248
2. Other Individuals			
a. Cases opened.	1270	1791	3061
b. Cases closed.	739	435	1174
c. Number contacted.	663	559	1222
d. Number completely cooperative but not potential informant material.	248	200	448
e. Number cooperative and being developed as PSIs.*	107	110	217
f. Number completely negative.	308	249	557
3. Results			
a. Number of PSIs developed.	34	40	74
b. Number of sources developed.	33	36	69
c. Number of informants developed.	3	11	14

66-2542 Sub 3

RECORDED-91

66-2542-3-1025

cc: Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Baumgardner
 Mr. Donohue


*Potential Security Informants.

14 OCT 2 1956

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(5)

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EX-116



Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

It is pointed out that the number of active communists contacted under this program showed an increase in the month of August over the month of July. Likewise, the number of other individuals contacted increased over the past month. In August, fewer cases were opened than in July on individuals other than communists, however, more cases were closed than in the previous month which reflects considerable review on the part of the field and elimination of those cases determined undesirable for contact under this program. The number of individuals contacted who were cooperative but not PSI material showed an increase of 48 over the last month but the number cooperative and being developed as PSIs decreased from 110 to 107.

The field continues to show great interest and enthusiasm in this project which is an effective means of obtaining PSI material by the acceleration of interviews and the elimination of those individuals who have no desire to assist the Bureau or are in no position to do so. It was necessary during the past month to send only one communication to a division which reflected lack of progress under this program and close supervision will be maintained to be certain that all offices maintain the proper interest to make it a success.

Next month another memorandum will be prepared showing the progress of the Security Informant Program and it will reflect the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

✓ 10.773 gm ✓ ✓ ✓

MR. A. H. BELMONT

September 28, 1956

ccw
W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
100-3-99

In view of the recent manifestations of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, every effort is being made to develop additional security informants from among communists who are of Jewish origin. To further this program, the Central Research Section has furnished to the field copies of several publications dealing with Soviet anti-Semitism which have been issued by various anticommunist Jewish organizations.

On April 13, 1956, the "Daily Worker," east coast communist newspaper, printed an editorial which was extremely critical of Soviet anti-Semitism. The circulation of the "Daily Worker" is a little over 7,000 and is largely limited to the New York area. It is, therefore, felt that many members of the Communist Party, USA, who are of Jewish origin may not have had an opportunity to read this editorial.

Since the field has already been furnished considerable material on Soviet anti-Semitism from anticommunist sources for use in connection with the captioned program, it is felt that this editorial which appeared in the "Daily Worker" would provide excellent material for developing potential security informants who are of Jewish origin. Copies of this editorial could be furnished anonymously to individuals being considered for development as informants prior to any contact in an effort to get them to cooperate with the Bureau. Conrad

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Central Research Section be authorized to reproduce 500 copies of the enclosed excerpts from this editorial for dissemination to the field. They will be distributed to the field by routing slip as in the past.

Enclosure

JFC:njp

(6)

- 1 - J. F. Condon
- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - J. D. Donohue
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - 66-2542-3

JK
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166-2542-3-
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176 OCT 10 1956

The following comments on Soviet anti-Semitism appeared in an editorial in the "Daily Worker" on April 13, 1956:

"WE FEEL a deep sense of indignation, anger and grief over the latest disclosures of violation of socialist principles under the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union. We refer to the apparent confirmation this week by a Jewish Communist paper in Poland of the charge that a large number of Jewish writers and other Jewish leaders were framed up and executed and that Jewish culture was virtually wiped out.

"We denounce and protest this crime not only because of the horrible actions themselves. We have here a gross departure from the socialist principles upon which the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the history of man, is founded.

"... socialist principles were criminally violated in the late 1940s when Jewish leaders were framed and executed, when Jewish newspapers and other expression of Jewish culture were banned.

"We register our strong dissatisfaction that the Soviet leaders have not offered any explanation of what took place.

"Every supporter of socialism every honest foe of racism, has a right to expect an explanation and a duty to ask for it.

"... the Soviet leaders should explain to their friends and other honest workers in all countries, how these crimes were perpetrated. What false theories, if any, played a part in the violations? What has been done to punish all those responsible? What has been done to rectify the misdeeds? What is being done to guarantee against repetition of these actions against any minorities in the Soviet Union?

"For our part, we frankly admit we were too prone to accept the explanation of why Jewish culture had disappeared in the Soviet Union in the late 1940s. Had we not done so, we would have served the cause of socialism better."

1 - Yellow file copy
1 - Bufile 66-2542-3

1 - J. F. Condon
1 - Section tickler
1 - J. D. Donchue
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - J. S. Johnson
2 - Original and copy

September 14, 1956

SAC, New York

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

59465

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
TOPLEV

You should attempt to obtain 300 copies of the booklet
Soviet Crimes and Khrushchev's Confessions published by the Public
Affairs Committee of Freedom House, New York City. The copies
of this booklet should be forwarded to the Bureau marked for the
attention of the Central Research Section.

This matter should be handled immediately so that the most
effective use possible can be made of this booklet in connection with
the captioned program.

JFC:mjh
(8)

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Gandy _____

SEARCHED, INDEXED, SERIALIZED, FILED

MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

September 13, 1956

MR. A. H. BELMONT

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
TOPLEV
Bufile 100-3-89

Summary Informants

An article which appeared on page 6 of the September 11, 1956, issue of the Daily Mirror, daily newspaper published in New York City, set forth that the Public Affairs Committee of Freedom House had issued a booklet dealing with the crimes committed by the Soviet Union against its citizens and the free world. The Director instructed, "We should get a copy of this rept. H."

The text of this report appears on pages 128-142 of the September 7, 1956, issue of U.S. News & World Report and was reviewed by the Central Research Section for possible use in connection with the captioned program. The report is a chronological account of the "crimes against humanity" in the Soviet Union from 1917 when the communists seized power until the present time. It proves that suppression, persecution, and mass murder have been used by the Soviet regime since its inception and not merely since the 1930s as present communist propaganda claims. It also shows that the present Soviet leaders were "deeply involved" in the crimes for which they are now trying to place the blame on Stalin alone. The article sets forth that the crimes of Stalin which were exposed by Khrushchev (purges, military mistakes, personal vengeance) were all crimes which weakened the communist movement. As yet, Khrushchev has made no mention of all the crimes committed by Stalin against the people of the Soviet Union, and has given every indication that the present Soviet leaders intend to continue the repressive measures developed under Stalin.

It is felt that this booklet would prove extremely effective in contacting potential security informants. It would be used in an anonymous fashion, such as being sent through the mails to individuals for the purpose of softening them up prior to interview, and, therefore, could not be traced to the Bureau. A letter is enclosed instructing the New York office to obtain 300 copies of this booklet. The cost of 300 copies is \$36.00.

Enclosures

JFC:nar

(9)

- 1 - J. F. Condon
- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - J. D. Donohue
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - J. E. Johnson

16-351d-3
NOT RECORDED
188 SEP 18 1956

*✓ 1 - Mr. Nichols
1 - Bufile 66-2542-3*

Memorandum to Mr. L. V. Boardman from Mr. A. H. Belmont

The New York office is forwarding a copy of this booklet to the Bureau today. Upon receipt, it will be immediately sent to the Director for his perusal.

The September 7, 1958, issue of U. S. News & World Report is enclosed for the Director's information.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That the enclosed letter to the New York office be approved.
- (2) That the Central Research Section be authorized to forward copies of this booklet to the field by routing slip after they have been obtained by the New York office. The number of copies furnished to the field will vary in accordance with the amount of communist activity within the territories covered by the individual offices. Routing slips will be used in the interest of economy.

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 9-25-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Secy. Inf. - Genl.

REMOVED BY 393 OCT 9 1956

FILE NUMBER 66-25423-1026

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

September 11, 1956

**PROPOSED CHANGES IN
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS**

Section 107 N of the Manual of Instructions entitled "Security Informants" should be changed as follows:

Subsections 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 23 should be deleted and a new subsection 5 added as follows:

To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization. In requesting this authorization a justification must be set forth containing the following items using these subheadings:

- (1) Residence and employment.
- (2) Current membership in organizations.
- (3) Summary of information furnished during pertinent period.
- (4) Amount paid for services and expenses by month.
- (5) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity.
- (6) Number of written and oral reports submitted.
- (7) Information furnished of unusual value.
- (8) Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance.
- (9) Informant's potential for advancement.
- (10) Stability and reliability.
(Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.)
- (11) Indoctrination against disclosure.
(State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)

NOT RECORDED

21 SEP 18 1956

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 Belmont _____
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 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
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 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memo Belmont to Boardman dated 9-11-56, captioned "Security Informants and Sources, Justification Letters." JDD:aml

JDD:aml
(7)

67 SEP 19 1956

- (12) All necessary action taken on information furnished.
- (13) Miscellaneous.
(Any other matters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention.)
- (14) Recommendation.
(Use following wording as nearly as possible:
"I, therefore, recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to \$ (amount) per (month, week) for services, plus \$ (amount) per (month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of months, effective (date).")

(Where applicable substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source or source of information for the word informant.)

Subsections 7, 8, 9 and 12 should now follow subsection 2B.

Old subsections 15 and 16 should now read as follows:

If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every three months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 5 except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth.

Section 107 U 6 entitled "Security Confidential Sources" should be changed as follows:

(a) Every three months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107 E 5 for form of letter.

Subsections (b), (c) and (d) should be deleted and new (b) should read as follows:

(b) If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

Section 87 E 5c should be changed as follows:

(5) Every three months submit letter of justification to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel sources. See 107 E 5 of Manual of Instructions for form of letter.

Delete (5) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f). The next paragraph should now read as follows:

If the source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

DATE OF MAIL 10-24-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Secy. Inf. - General

REMOVED BY NOV 9 1956 ³⁹³

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1027

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

MR. A. H. BELMONT

October 11, 1956

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLIV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Buffle 100-3-98

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Central Intelligence Agency
General Intelligence Work
General

By letter dated October 5, 1956, New York office furnished copies of a pamphlet entitled "Now They Admit It... Communist Confessions of Crimes against Jews," issued by the American Jewish Committee (AJC), a copy of which is enclosed. Through the use of quotations from both communist and noncommunist sources, this pamphlet emphasizes the crimes committed in the Soviet Union against persons of Jewish origin. The New York office also advised that it could probably obtain 500 additional copies of this pamphlet without charge through Mrs. Lucy Dawidowicz, a source of information at the AJC. It is felt that this pamphlet would be of considerable assistance in developing additional security informants from among communists of Jewish origin. As in the past, this material will be furnished anonymously to potential informants prior to interview in an effort to dispose them favorably toward cooperating with the Bureau.

The New York office also advised that Mrs. Dawidowicz has, in the past, furnished substantial quantities of public source material which have been utilized in connection with the captioned program without any cost to the Bureau. She has also been of considerable assistance to the New York office in furnishing information regarding several Jewish communist front groups. In addition, she has expressed a great admiration for the Bureau's work in the internal security field. The New York office suggested that a letter be forwarded to Mrs. Dawidowicz expressing the Bureau's appreciation for her cooperation. Bufiles contain no data which would preclude this correspondence with Mrs. Dawidowicz.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the enclosed letter instructing the New York office to obtain 500 additional copies of the publication entitled "Now They Admit It... Communist Confessions of Crimes against Jews" be approved, and that the Central Research Section be authorized to furnish copies to the field by routing slip.

(2) That this memorandum be routed to the Crime Records Section so that a letter of appreciation to Mrs. Dawidowicz can be prepared.

Enclosures

JFC:mjh

(1)

4x - J. V. Condon
71 Section Tighter
71 R. J. DeSouza

ENCLOSURE filed with

10/30/56

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - M. A. Jones
1 - Buffle 66-2542-3

166-2542-3- ✓
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140 OCT 31 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-3-98

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SIR 4

DATE: November 2, 1956

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

BRONX COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF
POLITICAL PRISONERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

New York advised by teletype [redacted] that according to [redacted] Communist Party (CP) member, reported to [redacted] during a meeting [redacted] of the Bronx Committee for Freedom of Political Prisoners (BCFPP), she had been contacted by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC) relative to a campaign which the ECLC is to undertake against the FBI. Allegedly the ECLC plans a national campaign against the FBI for "molesting the people in the streets and in their homes." This will be in the form of a test case which they will take to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The ECLC, according to [redacted] requested a meeting with the BCFPP in order to work out a plan of campaign. It was decided to have representatives of both groups meet at the residence of Altshuler 11/19/56. New York advised the informant was alerted to report any and all activity in this matter.

This apparently refers to the Bureau's activity in conducting interviews with subversives under our various interview programs. At the present time we have two specific programs which involve interviews with subversives. These are the Toplev and Security Informant Programs. The Toplev Program was inaugurated in 1951 and consists of interviewing high-ranking communists as potential informants. The Security Informant Program embodies interviews with rank-and-file communists and other subversives not only to develop informants but also as a means of resolving security investigations.

These programs have met with outstanding success and as an example our two highest ranking informants in the Party today were developed through such interviews. We have obtained voluminous

Enclosure

cc - 100-384660 (Emergency Civil Liberties Committee)

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Rushing
Mr. Donohue

TDR:JDD:ojk
(6)
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EX-126

3 NOV 9 1956

REC

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
BRONX COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

intelligence information through these interviews which have not only produced informants and resolved security investigations but also has had a disruptive effect on the Party itself. For years the Party and sympathetic front groups have kept up a running attack on the FBI through media of the CP press due to our interview programs. To be certain we are on firm ground under these programs the field has been instructed to be most circumspect in making approaches to communists.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Party and sympathetic organizations have in the past taken steps to try to make our interview programs ineffective and to cause us embarrassment; however, this represents the first indication that there is a plan under consideration to make a test case of an interview. It is not clear how they intend to approach this problem. To offset any such attack which the ECLC contemplates our Agents are presently under instructions that when a subject is approached to inform the subject he is under no restriction of movement and he may terminate the contact at will. In other words, we make it clear during our interview that we are not impeding or hindering the subject's activity or physical movement in any way. In the past various tactics by the CP to hamper us in connection with these interviews have been brought to the attention of the field and it is felt that we should realert the field to this development. New York has been telephonically instructed to have [redacted] attend the proposed meeting on 11/19/56 if possible and to develop all other information through its sources and informants on this matter.

ACTION:

(1) We will follow this closely with New York and if it is ascertained a concrete plan to embarrass the Bureau is being developed recommendations to counter such a plan will be made in order to fully protect the Bureau.

b7D

(2) In order that the field may be aware of this latest attempt by the Party and its sympathetic organizations to embarrass the Bureau, there is attached proposed letter to all SACs. (Duplimat)

Copy of

JFB
JPR
GPM
JFB

✓
OK
X

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: November 15, 1956

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS

SAC Letter 56-34 permits the SAC in many instances to authorize interviews with individuals to determine if they have any potential as informants. In certain cases the field must get Bureau authority to make such contacts but in either event if the individual is cooperative background investigation must then be conducted, results furnished to the Bureau and specific authority obtained to approach the individual as a security informant.

In view of this change the provision in the Manual of Instructions, Section 107, on security informants which requires authority to contact an individual to determine if he is willing to act as an informant is no longer necessary and should be deleted.

ACTION:

For approval, there is attached for transmittal to the Planning Section, Training and Inspection Division, appropriate changes in Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions and Part I of the FBI Handbook.

Enclosure

cc - Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Baumgardner
 Planning Section
 Training and Inspection Division
 Mr. Donohue

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MR. A. H. BELMONT

November 1, 1956

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Bufile 100-3-99

Since January, 1954, the Central Research Section has been forwarding to the field public source anticommunist pamphlets for use in connection with the captioned program. This practice was initiated at the specific request of the Agents who are attempting to develop additional security informants so that this material could be furnished prior to, during, and after interviews. The Agents engaged in this program requested that, wherever possible, public source material be forwarded which is not identified as being issued by any Government agency since, for the purpose of developing informants, this type of material is not as effective as publications of private organizations. (100-3-99-1660, 1749)

Since the inception of this practice, many favorable comments regarding the effectiveness of the material furnished to the field have been received during conferences both at the Seat of Government and in the field. In addition, a number of offices have requested additional copies of several publications which have been forwarded to the field.

A survey made by the Bureau in 1955 disclosed that this public source material was utilized effectively by the field in the following ways: (1) It is mailed anonymously to potential informants before they are interviewed; (2) It is furnished to potential informants during interviews as a basis for suggesting further discussion at subsequent interviews; (3) It is mailed to potential informants after they have been interviewed; (4) It is used as a basis for discussions at security squad conferences; (5) It is studied by Agents prior to interviews with potential informants as possible material for discussion during the actual interviews. The memorandum setting forth the results of this survey is enclosed.

The Denver office recently advised that this public source material was also furnished to newly developed security informants to increase their knowledge of communism in an effort to further their development in the Communist Party, USA. A carbon copy of the Denver letter is enclosed.

Enclosures

JFC:mjh

(6) 58 NOV 29 1956

- 1 - J. F. Condon
- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - J. D. Donohue
- 1 - Mr. Belmont

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✓ 1 - Bufile 66-2542-3

MR. A. H. BELMONT

November 19, 1956

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLBV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Bufile 100-S-99

D SECURITY INFORMATION - 67-25416

Reference is made to my memorandum dated November 1, 1956, which recommended that the field not be restricted to using public source material in an anonymous manner while attempting to develop additional security informants. The issue has been raised whether or not the Bureau, in using this public source material, could possibly be violating the Copyright Law.

The following information was furnished by Mr. R. S. MacCarteney, Chief, Reference Division, Copyright Office, Library of Congress, and his assistant, Mr. D. J. Plumb. Title 17 (Copyright Law) of the U. S. Code provides that any person who is entitled to the protection of the Copyright Law has the exclusive right "To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work.... (Section 1 (a)). Copyright for any work is secured "...by publication thereof with the notice of copyright..." (Section 10).

With reference to the material being furnished to the field for possible use in connection with the captioned program, most of these publications are not copyrighted. There is, therefore, no possibility of any violation of the Copyright Law in this instance, since the Copyright Law is not applicable. The copyrighted material which is being furnished to the field was obtained by the Bureau legally from the organization which holds the copyright. This material has not been reprinted by the Bureau and is not being sold by the Bureau. There is, therefore, no possible violation of the Copyright Law in this case. The only material which is being sent to the field which was reprinted by the Bureau is a reprint of extracts from an editorial which appeared in the April 13, 1956, issue of the Daily Worker, east coast communist newspaper. The records of the Copyright Office, Library of Congress, disclose that the Daily Worker is not copyrighted so there is no possible violation of the law in this instance.

On items to be forwarded to the field in the future for use in connection with the captioned program, a check will be made at the Bureau to insure that dissemination of this material is proper under the Copyright Law.

Enclosures

JFC:mjh

(6) 24 NOV 29 1956
1 - G. F. Condon

1 - Section tickler
1 - J. D. Donohue

16-3542-3
NOT RECORDED
126 NOV 28 1956

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Bufile 66-2542-3

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Bufile 100-3-99

During the period of almost three years in which the field has been using this public source material to the Bureau's advantage, there have been no instances in which any problem has arisen or in which the Bureau has been embarrassed through the use of these publications. Recently, however, the issue was raised that these publications should only be forwarded anonymously to individuals being considered for interview prior to the interview in an effort to dispose them favorably toward cooperating with the Bureau. It is believed that this restriction on the use of this public source anticomunist material drastically reduces its effectiveness. The difficulties which are being encountered presently in attempting to develop additional security informants are too well known to need further comment. Any restriction in the use of this public source material which has proved so effective in the past will merely add to these difficulties.

This entire matter was taken up at the recent Internal Security-Espionage Conference. The Conference voted unanimously in favor of using this public source material both openly and anonymously. It was indicated by the men that the restriction of the use of this public source material would seriously interfere with its effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the unanimous vote by the members of the Internal Security-Espionage Conference, and in view of the fact that this public source material has been used effectively for almost three years without any unfavorable repercussions, it is recommended that the field not be restricted to using this material anonymously in the future. If this recommendation is approved, no further action will be necessary.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Bufile 100-3-99

A copy of the publication Copyright Law of the United States of America is enclosed together with my memorandum dated November 1, 1956. It is to be noted that this memorandum sets forth that the recent Internal Security-Espionage Conference voted unanimously in favor of using this public source material both openly and anonymously. The class pointed out how valuable and helpful it has been to them. It was indicated by the Agents attending this Conference that any restrictions on the use of this public source material would seriously interfere with its effectiveness. A letter to all continental offices authorizing the field to continue using this public source material either anonymously or publicly is enclosed.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the enclosed letter to the field be approved.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Bufile 100-3-99

A copy of the publication Copyright Law of the United States of America is enclosed together with my memorandum dated November 1, 1956. It is to be noted that this memorandum sets forth that the recent Internal Security-Espionage Conference voted unanimously in favor of using this public source material both openly and anonymously. The class pointed out how valuable and helpful it has been to them. It was indicated by the Agents attending this Conference that any restrictions on the use of this public source material would seriously interfere with its effectiveness. A letter to all continental offices authorizing the field to continue using this public source material either anonymously or publicly is enclosed.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the enclosed letter to the field be approved.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Nichols Kleinkauf
Boardman
Belmont
Thornton
Donohue
November 19, 1956

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Director, FBI

BRONX COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM
OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

EMERGENCY CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Captioned organizations, which have been under investigation by this Bureau for a considerable period of time as communist front organizations, are jointly sponsoring a meeting to be held on the evening of November 19, 1956, for the purpose of planning a national campaign against this Bureau "for molesting people in the streets and in their homes" and to bring a test case concerning this before the United States Supreme Court. A confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that at this meeting I. Philip Sipser, a prominent labor attorney, will talk on civil liberties and the program of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee in connection with the afore-mentioned matter. According to the informant, Sipser will outline the national campaign against this Bureau.

It is to be noted that the October 4, 1944, issue of the "Daily Worker" listed an Isadore Sipser, Brooklyn, New York, as one of the persons to be contacted by members of the International Workers Order, the Communist Political Association, and the American Labor Party in getting out to vote. One I. Philip Sipser has been identified as a contributor to the Civil Rights Congress. It is not known whether these individuals are identical with the Sipser who is to speak at the November 19, 1956, meeting.

Another confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that recently Claude Lightfoot, chairman of the Illinois-Indiana Communist Party, stated that this Bureau is harassing Communist Party members through interviews with them and that the purpose of

100-412902
100-384660

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cc - Bufile 66-2542 Sub 3 (Security Informant Program)

JHK:gft
(13) 100

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to The Attorney General

these interviews is twofold; namely, to harass the Communist Party and to influence the current discussion in the ranks of the Communist Party. Lightfoot commented that this Bureau's program is partially successful because some people become scared and either talk to the Agents of this Bureau or refuse to have anything more to do with the Communist Party. Lightfoot further stated that there has been some discussion within the Party as to whether the Party should raise publicly the issue of harassment, stating that this might be done through bringing the matter to the attention of the American Civil Liberties Union or through various newspapers or other means which might bring the matter to the attention of the public, and that the Bureau would be accused of being a political police which is trying to participate in the inner affairs of the Communist Party and trying to intimidate people.

The second informant also advised this matter has not yet been raised officially but there is a possibility it may be considered both by the national office of the Communist Party and by the leadership of the Illinois-Indiana Communist Party District.

It appears that the afore-mentioned refers to the effective program which this Bureau has been carrying on for a number of months of interviewing individuals on whom there was definite evidence of Communist Party affiliations but on whom there was reason to believe these individuals had ceased open Party activities. For your information, out of deference to the so-called communist or former communist, in conducting these interviews the Special Agents avoided conducting the interviews at the homes or places of business of the individuals but approached them on the street or elsewhere so they could be talked to without attracting attention. In each instance the Agents fully identified themselves and if a particular individual did not want to talk, that was up to him. This practice was followed so that in the event the individual had broken with the communists and for his own reason did not want to publicly declare himself, either through fear of retaliation on the part of the communists or for business

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

Letter to The Attorney General

reasons, the individual could declare himself to the Bureau under circumstances whereby there was no conceivable way to embarrass the individual. This program was designed with a twofold function in mind: (1) the civil libertarian principle and (2) to discharge our duty of seeking additional information concerning the communist conspiracy.

In view of the fact, as noted above, that the Communist Party might try to publicize the Bureau's activity in this regard through the American Civil Liberties Union, an official of this Bureau on November 14, 1956, contacted Irving Ferman, Washington, D. C., representative of the American Civil Liberties Union, and explained the program to him and the manner in which individuals were approached under the program. Mr. Ferman advised he thought this was certainly laudable. Mr. Ferman was also advised that in view of the success of this program on the part of the Bureau there has been talk recently that the communists are rapidly reaching the point where they would have to combat the program and that they had elected a plan seeking to use the American Civil Liberties Union to protest the program. It was pointed out to Mr. Ferman that he might be desirous of this information in order that the American Civil Liberties Union could protect itself by not becoming a dupe of the communists. Mr. Ferman advised he appreciated this and would bring it to the attention of Patrick Malin, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Further pertinent details received concerning the afore-mentioned will be furnished you promptly.

cc - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

cc - Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Planning Section
Training and Inspection Division
Mr. Donohue

59466

November 15, 1956

PROPOSED CHANGE IN
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
FBI HANDBOOK

The Manual of Instructions, Section 197,
Security Informants, should be changed as follows:

D. CONTACT WITH POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to approach individual as a PSI.
2. When authority granted by Bureau to approach as potential informant, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.

The following change should be made in Part I of the FBI Handbook:

Section 26. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

A. Security informant

3. Contact with potential informants
When background information has been obtained in the manner described above the results of the inquiry should be transmitted to the Bureau in the same sequence as set out in 2. above and authority requested to approach the individual as a PSI. When authority is granted by the Bureau the approach should be made and if the individual does furnish information he should be designated by a permanent symbol number and the Bureau advised. Advise Bureau of any weakness of informant and safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to the Bureau.

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See memo to Belmont from Baumgardner dated 11/15/56 captioned
"Security Informants," JDD:ojk.

JDD:ojk

(7) ejf fcm

Vfm

OB 23/11
11/15/56

UNRECORDED
FILED IN
SEC. 26

Original on Duplimat.

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Rushing
Mr. Donohue

SAC, Albany

November 6, 1956

Director, FBI (100-358086)

INTERVIEWS WITH SECURITY SUBJECTS

Information has been received that the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC) plans a national campaign against the FBI for "molesting the people in the streets and in their homes." Reportedly, the ECLC will make a test case of an interview by the FBI and when ready will take the case as high as the U.S. Supreme Court. It is not known exactly how the ECLC intends to implement this plan.

Agents conducting interviews and reinterviews with security subjects and other individuals should be instructed to be most circumspect in making such contacts and to be alert to any situation which could result in embarrassment to the Bureau. Any information received reflecting the activity of the ECLC or any other group along this line should be brought promptly to the attention of the Bureau.

2cc - Albuquerque
2cc - Anchorage
2cc - Atlanta
2cc - Baltimore
2cc - Birmingham
2cc - Boston
2cc - Buffalo
2cc - Butte
2cc - Charlotte
2cc - Chicago
2cc - Cincinnati
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2cc - Dallas
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2cc - El Paso
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2cc - Miami
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2cc - New York
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2cc - Oklahoma City
2cc - Omaha
2cc - Philadelphia
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2cc - Pittsburgh 16-3872
2cc - Portland NOT RECORD
2cc - Richmond 44 NOV 18 19
2cc - St. Louis
2cc - Salt Lake City
2cc - San Antonio
2cc - San Diego
2cc - San Francisco
2cc - San Juan
2cc - Savannah
2cc - Seattle
2cc - Springfield
2cc - Washington Field

Leo - 66-2542-3 (Security Informants Program)
cc - 100-384660 (Emergency Civil Liberties Committee)
NOTE ON YELLOW: No Manual or Handbook changes necessary.
See memo Belmont-Boardman 11/2/56 TDR:JBD:jrk, captioned

TDR:JBD:jrk (8) "SIP, BOFF, IS-C."

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *11/25/56*

DATE: November 27, 1956

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM *Ken*

As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of this year, SAC Letter 56-34 dated June 18, 1956, set forth changes in policy and procedure which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. This authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing results of this program for the month of October, the preceding month of September, and the grand total from the inception of this program which has been in existence for the past four months.

	OCTOBER	SEPTEMBER	TOTAL
1. Active Communists Number contacted.	164	142	554
2. Other Individuals			
a. Cases opened.	1268	958	5404
b. Cases closed.	1140	961	3353
c. Number contacted.	933	794	3016
1. Number cooperative but not potential informant material.	296	273	1056
2. Number cooperative and being developed as PSIs.	129	132	473
3. Number completely negative.	508	389	1487
3. Results Number of sources, PSIs and informants developed.	61	48	253

66-2542-3

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Donohue

RECORDED - 54

66-2542-3-1030

JDD:ojk
(5)

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Baumgardner
D. J. C.

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman
RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542 Sub 3

It is noted that the number of active communists and other individuals initially contacted under this program again showed an increase over the previous month. All other categories show a substantial increase except the number of persons contacted who were cooperative and are being developed as PSIs. There was a decrease of three in this group.

The field is continuously recontacting and reinterviewing communists and other individuals who have been uncooperative in the past where circumstances indicate additional contacts may prove profitable from the standpoint of obtaining information of value to the Bureau. The field continues to show considerable enthusiasm and interest in this program which is an effective means of obtaining PSI material by the acceleration of interviews and the elimination of those persons who have no desire to assist the Bureau or are in no position to do so. During the past month it was necessary to direct letters to two offices, Atlanta and Springfield, which reflected a lack of progress and close supervision is being maintained on all offices to insure proper interest is maintained and to make certain this program is a success.

ACTION:

Next month another memorandum will be prepared showing the progress of the Security Informant Program and it will reflect the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

✓ EFB
W.C.
AB/AB
APR 1968
APR 1968

DATE OF MAIL 11-23-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT

JUNE MAIL

Secy. Info. - General

F632

REMOVED BY 57 DEC 19 1956

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1031

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Date

10-15-56

To: Director, FBI	From: SAC, SAN DIEGO	Employee assigned to (Division) SAN DIEGO
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SUGGESTION

Attention: Central Research Section

It is suggested that Central Research compile a list of instances where Russia and other Iron Curtain countries have used Informants (Stool Pigeons) to bring to trial members of the underground in their countries. All other known instances of the use of Informants by Iron Curtain countries should be listed.

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

Not applicable.

Advantages of suggestion

CP members and CP sympathizers, who might be willing to defect except for their aversion to being considered "stool pigeons", might be persuaded to become Informants if concrete examples of the use of Informants by Russia and other Iron Curtain countries could be given them, especially examples which have received some notoriety in the newspapers or other publications. Naturally, any instances where the use of Informants was publicized in the Soviet or Communist presses would be of inestimable value.

Disadvantages of suggestion

None known.

Memo dictated to Mr. Dettweiler 10/31/56 - G.H. 66-3145-5-1032
RECORDED-31 33

11 OCT 22 1956

Annual Savings (Show basis for estimate)

Not applicable.

INDEXED-31

ack 10/25/56 - ecu
Referred to Learn. Intel.
This par received 10/29/56 - G.H.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States)

Mr. Mrs. Miss

WILLIAM E. DETTWEILER, JR.

Signature and Title of Suggester Special Agent

Recommendations and comments of Division Head Suggestion appears sound; however, its practicability is unknown from the Bureau's standpoint

52 DEC 6 1956

3 - Bureau *denied* (66-1006)
2 - San Diego (1-67-1589) (66-1006)

WED:HB
(5)

H. G. MAYNOR

Special Agent in Charge

Signature and Title

PERS

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 10/31/56

FROM : Q. Tamm

✓pm
D.J.SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #198-57
Made by SA William E. Dettweiler, Jr.
San Diego Division

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SUGGESTION: That the Central Research Section of Domestic Intelligence Division compile a list of instances where Russia and other Iron Curtain countries have used Informants (Stool Pigeons) to bring to trial members of the underground in their countries. All other known instances of the use of Informants by Iron Curtain countries should be listed.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Communist Party (CP) members and CP sympathizers, who might be willing to defect except for their aversion to being considered "stool pigeons," might be persuaded to become Informants if concrete examples of the use of Informants by Russia and other Iron Curtain countries could be given them, especially examples which have received some notoriety in the newspapers or other publications. Suggester states that any instances where the use of Informants was publicized in the Soviet or communist presses would be of inestimable value.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Maynor, San Diego, believes the suggestion is sound although he does not know its practicability from the Bureau's standpoint.

Inspector Sizoo, Domestic Intelligence Division, believes the suggestion has some merit, but it is also subject to criticism. For years, all opponents of communism in the United States have been pointing to the informant system in Soviet Russia as being especially wicked and antidemocratic, and to offer examples of this condemned system to communists in this country as reasons why they should serve as informants would be inconsistent. We know that the informant system in Russia has been tied into rigged and totally unjust court trials and procedures. It would be hard to separate something of value from the valueless in this particular maze. 66-2543-3-1033

RECORDED-31
Mr. Sizoo states, however, there is no reason why the Central Research Section cannot keep this suggestion on its N.Y. agenda and during the course of its other work keep an eye open for some legitimate examples which can be written up and sent to the field for use in the informant development program. Mr. Sizoo notes that two monographs have already been sent to the field treating the subject of "stool pigeon."

Enclosures - Detach. 1, 2, 3, 4 INDEXED-31

cc: Mr. Belmont (attention Mr. W. C. Sullivan) (sent separately)
 (4) S2 DEP Personnel file of SA William E. Dettweiler, Jr.

Q. Tamm memo for Mr. Tolson
Re Suggestion #198-57

10/31/56

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the suggestion be adopted to the effect that Central Research Section will be alert to legitimate examples which can be written up and furnished the field for use in the informant development program. *I am opposed. The criticism on preceding page is valid & overriding* *ZBaw*

2. That the enclosed letter be forwarded to SAC, San Diego. (Cancelled, see addendum)

3. That the enclosed letter be forwarded to SA William E. Dettweiler, Jr. (Cancelled, see addendum)

NBW
WWW

Zgr.

ADDENDUM BY TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION: 11/2/56 - ceh *E/H*

In view of the comments of Mr. Belmont and as a letter of appreciation has already been sent to Agent Dettweiler, no further action is recommended.

NBW
WWW

aprod

Vprod

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: November 30, 1956

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

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For the past four months the field has been reporting on a monthly basis results of work performed under the Security Informant Program. SAC Letter 56-34 dated June 18, 1956, sets forth changes in policy and procedure which permit the acceleration of interviews with individuals in an effort to obtain potential informants. It has been found during the past quarter that certain changes in the format of the monthly report are necessary and are set forth in the attached letter to Albany with copies to all offices.

ACTION:

For approval, there is attached a letter to Albany with copies to all offices.

(ENCLOSURE)

66-2542-8

Enclosure

cc - Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Baumgardner
 Mr. Donohue

JDD:ojk
(5)

50 DEC 10 1956 393

EX-125
RECORDED-37

66-2542-8-1034

DEC 7 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, Albany

FROM : Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

DATE:
December 5, 1956

Re SAC Letters 56-34 and 56-56 which have been incorporated in Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions.

Certain changes have been made in the manner of reporting results under this program and all offices should, therefore, carefully review previous instructions as well as directions contained in this letter to be certain the statistics are reported promptly and properly in the future.

2cc = Albuquerque	2cc = Milwaukee
2cc = Anchorage	2cc = Minneapolis
2cc = Atlanta	2cc = Mobile
2cc = Baltimore	2cc = Newark
2cc = Birmingham	2cc = New Haven
2cc = Boston	2cc = New Orleans
2cc = Buffalo	2cc = New York
2cc = Butte	2cc = Norfolk
2cc = Charlotte	2cc = Oklahoma City
2cc = Chicago	2cc = Omaha
2cc = Cincinnati	2cc = Philadelphia
2cc = Cleveland	2cc = Phoenix
2cc = Dallas	2cc = Pittsburgh
2cc = Denver	2cc = Portland
2cc = Detroit	2cc = Richmond
2cc = El Paso	2cc = St. Louis
2cc = Honolulu	2cc = Salt Lake City
2cc = Houston	2cc = San Antonio
2cc = Indianapolis	2cc = San Diego
2cc = Kansas City	2cc = San Francisco
2cc = Knoxville	2cc = San Juan
2cc = Little Rock	2cc = Savannah
2cc = Los Angeles	2cc = Seattle
2cc = Louisville	2cc = Springfield
2cc = Memphis	2cc = Washington Field
2cc = Miami	

66-2542-3-1034
ENCLOSURE

Letter to SAC, Albany
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

The report should take the following form:

	<u>During Past</u> <u>30 Days</u>	<u>Total to</u> <u>Date</u>
A. Active Communists		
Number contacted.		
B. Other Individuals		
1. Cases opened.		
2. Cases closed.		
3. Number contacted.		
a. Number cooperative but not potential informant material.		
b. Number cooperative and having informant potential.		
c. Number completely negative.		
C. Results		
Number of sources, PSIs and informants developed.		

With regard to items A and B, report only initial contacts with active communists and other individuals for the current month and from June 18, 1956, to date. Since reports up to this time have reflected contacts with active communists prior to June 18, 1956, as well as those since that time, review your monthly reports on this program submitted since July 1, 1956, and in your next report submit revised figures if necessary in your column entitled "Total to Date." Reinterviews and recontacts should not be counted under A or B but comment regarding such activity should be set forth in the narrative portion of the report. However, if an individual was contacted once or several times prior to June 18, 1956, and has been recontacted since that time he should now be counted once under A or B. In item B, 3, (a), (b) and (c) should reflect results of contacts reported under B, 3 and the total of these items should equal B, 3 in both columns.

It is noted that the report under this program previously required figures on the number of individuals "completely" cooperative but not potential informant material. In this new format under B, 3, (a) the word

Letter to SAC, Albany
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

"completely" is deleted. It has been found that many individuals upon being contacted for the first time are not "completely" cooperative but are worthy of recontacting to determine the extent of their cooperation. For purposes of this report if there is any degree of cooperation list it as a cooperative contact under B, 3 (a) or (b).

Once an individual has been placed in category B, 3, (a), (b) or (c) as the result of initial contacts his category should not be changed even though subsequent contacts reveal a different category is applicable inasmuch as the final affirmative results of all contacts will be shown in item C. For example, an individual may be cooperative and appear to have informant potential during initial contact but subsequent contacts may disclose that he actually has no informant potential. If such a person was placed in category B, 3, (b) as the result of the initial appraisal it will not be necessary to delete him from this category and place him in B, 3 (a).

If a file is opened and a review of the information contained therein is negative or preliminary inquiries indicate further action undesirable merely indicate in this report one case opened and one case closed. Do not count this as one negative contact under B, 3 (c).

Item C should contain the results of all affirmative contacts since June 18, 1956, reported under A and B. An individual should not be listed as a source, PSI or informant until Bureau authority has been received for the utilization or development of such person and as mentioned above the individual should be counted only once. It will not be necessary to break down the results as heretofore but list one total of sources, PSIs and informants for the month and to date from June 18, 1956. Negative results may be the subject of comment in the narrative portion of the report which should also contain a brief analysis of the progress being made, the number of Special Agents being utilized full time or part time in conducting interviews under this program and the percentage of time being spent on the program (not the number of days or hours) by all Agents assigned to security work in your office.

SAC, Albany

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Donohue

December 5, 1956

Director, FBI (66-2542-3)


SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAM

~~RECORDED~~ Re SAC Letters 36-34 and 56-56 which have been incorporated in Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions.

Certain changes have been made in the manner of reporting results under this program and all offices should, therefore, carefully review previous instructions as well as directions contained in this letter to be certain the statistics are reported promptly and properly in the future.

2cc	-	Albuquerque
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2cc	-	Honolulu
2cc	-	Houston
2cc	-	Indianapolis
2cc	-	Kansas City
2cc	-	Knoxville
2cc	-	Little Rock
2cc	-	Los Angeles
2cc	-	Louisville
2cc	-	Memphis
2cc	-	Miami

REC'D-READING	
2cc	- Milwaukee
2cc	- Minneapolis
2cc	- Mobile
2cc	- Newark
2cc	- New Haven
2cc	- New Orleans
2cc	- New York.
2cc	- Norfolk
2cc	- Oklahoma City
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2cc	- Philadelphia
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2cc	- Pittsburgh
2cc	- Portland
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2cc	- Salt Lake City
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See memo to Boardman from Belmont dated 11/30/56 captioned "Security Informant Program," JDD:ojk.

JDD:ojk
(109)

DEC 21 1

Letter to SAC, Albany
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3

The report should take the following form:

	During Past <u>30 Days</u>	Total to <u>Date</u>
A. Active Communists		
Number contacted.		
B. Other Individuals		
1. Cases opened.		
2. Cases closed.		
3. Number contacted.		
a. Number cooperative but not potential informant material.		
b. Number cooperative and having informant potential.		
c. Number completely negative.		
C. Results		
Number of sources, PSIs and informants developed.		

With regard to items A and B, report only initial contacts with active communists and other individuals for the current month and from June 18, 1956, to date. Since reports up to this time have reflected contacts with active communists prior to June 18, 1956, as well as those since that time, review your monthly reports on this program submitted since July 1, 1956, and in your next report submit revised figures if necessary in your column entitled "Total to Date." Reinterviews and recontacts should not be counted under A or B but comment regarding such activity should be set forth in the narrative portion of the report. However, if an individual was contacted once or several times prior to June 18, 1956, and has been recontacted since that time he should now be counted once under A or B. In item B, 3, (a), (b) and (c) should reflect results of contacts reported under B, 3 and the total of these items should equal B, 3 in both columns.

It is noted that the report under this program previously required figures on the number of individuals "completely" cooperative but not potential informant material. In this new format under B, 3, (a) the word

**Letter to SAC, Albany
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
66-2542-3**

"completely" is deleted. It has been found that many individuals upon being contacted for the first time are not "completely" cooperative but are worthy of recontacting to determine the extent of their cooperation. For purposes of this report if there is any degree of cooperation list it as a cooperative contact under B, 3 (a) or (b).

Once an individual has been placed in category B, 3, (a), (b) or (c) as the result of initial contacts his category should not be changed even though subsequent contacts reveal a different category is applicable inasmuch as the final affirmative results of all contacts will be shown in item C. For example, an individual may be cooperative and appear to have informant potential during initial contact but subsequent contacts may disclose that he actually has no informant potential. If such a person was placed in category B, 3, (b) as the result of the initial appraisal it will not be necessary to delete him from this category and place him in B, 3 (a).

If a file is opened and a review of the information contained therein is negative or preliminary inquiries indicate further action undesirable merely indicate in this report one case opened and one case closed. Do not count this as one negative contact under B, 3 (c).

Item C should contain the results of all affirmative contacts since June 18, 1956, reported under A and B. An individual should not be listed as a source, PSI or informant until Bureau authority has been received for the utilization or development of such person and as mentioned above the individual should be counted only once. It will not be necessary to break down the results as heretofore but list one total of sources, PSIs and informants for the month and to date from June 18, 1956. Negative results may be the subject of comment in the narrative portion of the report which should also contain a brief analysis of the progress being made, the number of Special Agents being utilized full time or part time in conducting interviews under this program and the percentage of time being spent on the program (not the number of days or hours) by all Agents assigned to security work in your office.

MR. A. H. BELMONT

November 29, 1956

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Bureau File 100-3-99

On November 27, 1956, copies of the publications listed in the enclosure were forwarded to the field by the Central Research Section. All of these publications have been previously approved for use in connection with the captioned program. The supply of those publications indicated by an asterisk was limited and distribution of these publications was limited to the following offices in which Communist Party membership and activity are concentrated:

Albany
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Denver
Detroit
Indianapolis
Los Angeles
Milwaukee

Minneapolis
Newark
New Haven
New York
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Portland
St. Louis
San Diego
San Francisco
Seattle
Washington Field

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information and recording purposes. This material was forwarded by routing slip as in the past.
Enclosure

JFC:mjh

(5)

1 - Section tickler

1 - J. D. Donohue / EXCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Bufile 66-2542-3

166-2542-3
NOT RECORDED

140 DEC 9 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 166-2542-3 - 211 SP

71 DEC 11 1956

November 29, 1956

1. Soviet crimes and Khrushchev's confessions
2. Under The Soviet Heel
3. Christianity vs. Communism
4. This Is Our Home
5. Do We Leave The Russian Jews To Their Fate?
6. Communism: Threat to Voluntary Groups
7. The Jews Under Stalin's Successors
8. Anti-Semitism Continues in the Soviet Satellites
9. Communist Anti-Semitism
10. Now They Admit It
11. Editorial, Daily Worker, April 13, 1956 (Reprinted by the Bureau)
12. Jews under Soviet Rule*
13. Aspects of Soviet Antisemitism*
14. The Negro in American Life*

ENCLOSURE

66-25472-3-✓

#269-57

Date

11/21/56

Employee assigned to (Division)

New York

To:
Director, FBI

From:

SA JAMES M. POWERS - GS-11

SUGGESTION

The increase and implementation of informant coverage by placing information of a pertinent nature in the hands of those agents who are in a position to utilize same.

*See my f...
NRC*

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

Advantages of suggestion

Without question, full informant coverage, in a broad sense, is the sine qua non in the criminal and security field. In actual practice it has come to the writer's attention that even in the development of basic contacts such as a neighborhood source or Panel Source there are many instances when substantial background investigation is conducted only to discover that for one reason or another the potential source fails to meet certain basic prerequisites. (Such failures may be attributed to, among other reasons, unfavorable credit, police record, lack of security consciousness.)

(Cont'd, page 2)

Disadvantages of suggestion

RECORDED - 22 66-254-1036

12-78
18 NOV 23 1956

CC demanded for compliance file

Annual Savings (Show basis for estimate)

ack 11/28/56 re cel

Revised 11/28/56 Dues 5 + 1
Total amount 11/28/56 - Cel

None of the above is based upon the United States

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States)



Mr.



Mrs.



Miss

James M. Powers SA.
Signature and Title of Suggester

Recommendations and comments of Division Head

It is not being recommended that this suggestion be adopted since agents' personal acquaintances back home in most instances will not be the type which could be developed as security or criminal informants.

52 DEC 31 1956

JAMES J. KELLY
Signature and Title
JAMES J. KELLY,
Special Agent in Charge
FBI, NEW YORK
PERS. FILES

NOV 23 1956

The question then arises - Is there any way we can diminish this contact with undesirable elements and yet continue at top speed on our informant program?

The attitude has been expressed by many agents that if they were assigned to their home communities, then when the question of development of neighborhood sources, Panel Sources, or Potential Security Informants arose, the majority of them would contact people they have had contact with over the years, such as friends, neighbors or associates. Even if these people were not utilized directly they certainly would form a base, or as it were, a pool from which additional and pertinent contacts could be made, depending on a specific need.

The purpose of this suggestion is the formulation of a plan whereby an agent not assigned to his home territory can at least render the benefit of his knowledge to those agents who are assigned there. The plan calls for the gathering and placing of pertinent information in the hands of personnel who may have the opportunity to utilize it.

With the passage of time, the majority of agents, now in the field, have of course, lost many of their contacts at home. For this reason it is suggested that the following plan commence with the current new agents' class. If the idea proves productive, contact with agents now assigned to the field could be made.

On the Friday signaling the end of new agent training the informant problem should be explained to each agent. They should then be requested to submit the names of any person whom they felt might be in a position to assist the Bureau in any capacity whatsoever. A thumbnail sketch could be submitted with each name. It would not be a requirement that the agent know intimately the person whose name he is submitting; sufficient I think, that he has a reasonable belief that the person is willing or is in a position to be of assistance to the Bureau. Next would come the transmittal of this information to the field office or resident agency in which this person, whose name was submitted, resides. Agents, upon receipt of such information would then be able to conduct indices, credit checks, etc., with, I am sure, a much lower mortality rate than now exists. If the person lived or worked in an area where the agent needed a source, contact could then be made. Such contact would at all times be discretionary.

Upon contact the individual would be advised that the interviewing agent had met agent X (agent submitting the name) in Washington or elsewhere and while discussing a problem with him, agent X had suggested that the individual might be in a position to assist the interviewing agent for some particular reason. If preferred, agent X's name need not be mentioned at all, and the contact could be made under any of the usual reasons. The purpose of the plan is, after all, just the location of sources and each agent could use his own discretion. Another advantage of this suggestion is that contact by an intermediary agent would prevent the development of too intimate a relationship which might otherwise arise if agent X had made the contact.

It is believed that the formation of such a pool of contacts would result in an increase in all types of informant coverage. A boyhood chum who is now business agent for a union, a former neighbor who now resides near a Security Index subject . . . the potential is there and the situations are limitless. It is sincerely believed that the suggestion will prove beneficial with a minimum expenditure of time and/or money.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *Mr. Boardman*

DATE: November 29, 1956

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT *Mr. Belmont*SUBJECT: SUGGESTION No. 267-57
~~INCREASE AND IMPLEMENTATION~~
~~OF INFORMANT COVERAGE~~

Under date of 11-21-56 SA James H. Powers, New York Office, points out that in the development of potential sources substantial background is obtained only to discover for one reason or another the potential source fails to meet certain basic prerequisites. He suggests that friends, neighbors and associates of an agent back in his home community could form a pool from which additional and pertinent contacts could be made. To implement such a program SA Powers suggests that during their training session new agents submit names of persons whom they feel might be in a position to assist the Bureau in any capacity whatsoever. A thumbnail sketch would be submitted with each name, and this information would then be transmitted to the field office in which the person resides whose name was submitted. In making this suggestion Agent Powers points out that the agent submitting a name need not know intimately the person whom he suggests, sufficient only that he has a reasonable belief that the person is willing or is in a position to be of assistance to the Bureau.

The SAC recommended against adoption of this proposal on the basis that an agent's personal acquaintances back home in most instances will not be the type which could be developed as security or criminal informants.

OBSERVATIONS:

The first prerequisite of any potential source is his willingness to cooperate; the second, his being in a position to give current information of value. Under provisions of SAC Letter 56-34, dated June 18, 1956, SACs were given permission to authorize interviews with any

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
 1 - Training and Inspection Division
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. McNerney

18 DEC 19 1956

4 DJM:rjl:hrt
 5 2 (5) JAN 3 1957

RECORDED - 22
 INDEXED - 22

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Memorandum to Mr. Boardman
Re: SUGGESTION No. 267-57

individuals who are not subjects of active security investigations, or not on the Security Index, or not subjects of investigations specifically requested by the Bureau, or where no delicate situation exists. Review of office files and a check of residence and employment must be made before conducting such SAC authorized interviews. If this initial interview determines the individual may be cooperative, then complete background investigation will be made in accordance with current manual instructions.

This procedure saves much time and correspondence by eliminating those persons who are not friendly with the Bureau and have no potential for informant development. It can be seen that this program, already in effect, overcomes the basic objection which gave rise to the suggestion under consideration and, at the same time, establishes immediately the cooperativeness of the person interviewed as a potential source.

Domestic Intelligence Division concurs with the opinion of SAC, New York, that in most instances an agent's personal acquaintances back home will not be the type which could be developed as informants. It is further pointed out that the agent's acquaintanceship with any individual does not preclude the possibility of such person having factors in his background which would prevent his use as a source. The background investigation would have to be conducted in any event.

Proposed suggestion does not appear to offer any program which would be more effective than that already in use by the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the above suggestion not receive favorable consideration.

AMW

Training and Inspection Division agrees with the above recommendation. No further action appears necessary as suggester has been thanked for his suggestion.

AMW *21W*

66-2542-3-1038

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-7-616X

APR 26 1957

PJS

C

DATE OF MAIL 12-26-56

~~HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.~~

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED
IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF
RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Informants - General

REMOVED BY 57 JAN 17 1957

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1039

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

GIR 8

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 14, 1956

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS AND FBI HANDBOOK
SECURITY INFORMANTS - SOURCES AND CONTACTS

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

At the present time instructions are outstanding that gifts should not be given to informants and expenditures for such purpose will not be approved as blue slip items. In addition gifts to office contacts and sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items. The field was advised by SAC Letter 55-28 dated April 8, 1955, as follows:

Gifts to office contacts and sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued and the relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.

Since it has been necessary to refer to this regulation on occasion it is suggested that it be incorporated in the appropriate Manuals and FBI Handbook.

ACTION:

There are attached for transmittal to the Training and Inspection Division suggested changes in the Manual of Instructions, Manual of Rules and Regulations and FBI Handbook.

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Training and Inspection Division
Mr. Donohue

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66-3042-3-1040
14 JAN 9 1957

RECORDED - 71

JDD:ojk
(5)

2 fm!

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Training and Inspection Division
Mr. Donohue

December 14, 1956

PROPOSED CHANGES IN
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
SECTION 107

N. PAYMENTS

1. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items. Investigative employees must not approach directly or indirectly representatives of companies, private industries or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts or products of such companies to informants.

U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

6. Security Confidential Source - Certification of Stability and Payments...
7. e. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

SECTION 87

E. INVESTIGATIONS OF COMMUNIST FRONT, NATIONALIST - TYPE AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

5. Panel Sources

- c. (5) Add to this paragraph the following sentence:
Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

See attached memo to Bardman from Belmont dated 12/14/56, captioned "Suggested Changes in Manual of Instructions, Manual of Rules and Regulations and FBI Handbook, Security Informants - Sources and Contacts," JDD:ojk.

W.W. JDD:ojk
260 (7)
JDD:ojk
W.W.
JDD:ojk

Vice 3/18/61
66-2542-3-1010

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Training and Inspection Division
Mr. Donohue

December 14, 1956

PROPOSED CHANGES IN
FBI HANDBOOK
PART I

26. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

A. Security Informant

8. Payments

a. Add to this paragraph the following sentence:
Gifts should not be given since such actions might be misconstrued. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items.

C. Confidential Source

made items →
6
front
5. Add to this paragraph the following sentence:
Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

D. Source of Information

made items →
2
front
1. Add to this paragraph the following sentence:
Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

See attached memo to Boardman from Belmont dated 12/14/56, captioned "Suggested Changes in Manual of Instructions, Manual of Rules and Regulations and FBI Handbook, Security Informants - Sources and Contacts," JDD:ojk.

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
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Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

JDD:ojk
(7)

WHD
fmb
WHD

R A R
V P S J D 66-2542-3-1040
W